INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES AND NUCLEAR ESCALATION: A STUDY OF STRATEGIC RISK

Abstract

Historical, territorial, and political differences between India and Pakistan have turned the old-time rivalry between the two countries into a deadly strategic rivalry after their nuclearization in 1998. This paper discusses the role of the possession of nuclear weapons on crisis behavior, intensification of security dilemmas, and the high probability of inadvertent escalation in South Asia. It dwells upon the main crises such as the Kargil conflict (1999), Mumbai attacks (2008), and Pulwama-Balakot standoff (2019), showing a paradox of deterrence that nuclear weapons prevent a full-scale war, but at the same time, it allows limited-scale conflicts under the umbrella of nuclear weapons. Based on both the theoretic frameworks of Stability-Instability paradox and the Escalation Dominance, the paper analyzes the reasons why no first use doctrine at India and Full Spectrum Deterrence doctrine at Pakistan (Doctrines of asymmetry) contribute to the increase in misperceptions and crisis instability. It further examines how tactical nuclear weapons, new technology and lack of effective crisis communication influence escalation dynamics. Additionally, the paper plays a very significant role in international mediation in de-escalating tensions. This study contends through a qualitative review of literature, policy reports, and case studies of the nuclear crises that the structural weaknesses of South Asian security architecture, coupled with nationalist politics and technological developments have greatly increased the strategic threat of a nuclear arms buildup between India and Pakistan.