

## EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF INDO-PAK CONFIDENCE BUILDING AGREEMENTS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW FROM KARACHI TO MUMBAI.

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### Abstract

*This research provides a historical review of Indo-Pakistan Confidence Building Agreements from the Karachi Agreement of 1949 to the Mumbai Attacks of 2008. Drawing from primary interviews, surveys, and secondary data, the study explores the evolution and impact of key bilateral treaties and declarations aimed at reducing conflict. Notable agreements include the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), Simla Agreement (1972), Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement (1991), and Lahore Declaration (1999). These measures were intended to foster cooperation, but their success was often limited by persistent distrust and recurring military confrontations. The study identifies the absence of consistent diplomatic follow-up, limited educational and cultural exchanges, and lack of scholarship and student mobility as barriers to lasting peace. Media hostility and blame games, particularly from the Indian side, have further deepened public animosity. The research concludes that while CBMs have occasionally eased tensions, their long-term effectiveness requires strong political will, people-to-people dialogue, trade concessions, and a cooperative approach to shared challenges like terrorism.*

### Introduction

India-Pakistan relations have long followed a “one step forward, two steps back” trajectory marked by mistrust and hostility (Khan, 2012). Recognising that permanent peace is a prerequisite for regional prosperity, both states have repeatedly turned to CBMs—yet the South Asian region remains volatile. Historical, territorial, and cultural differences (Kundi, 2009) continue to impede sustained détente, even though civil-society organisations and people-to-people contacts signal popular support for reconciliation.

Since 1949 the two countries have concluded a succession of agreements aimed at mitigating conflict. These begin with the Karachi Agreement establishing a UN-monitored cease-fire line, followed by the Liaquat–Nehru Pact (1950) on minority protections, the Indus Water Treaty (1960) resolving river-water disputes, the Tashkent Declaration (1966), the Simla Agreement (1972) converting the cease-fire line into the Line of Control, and the Delhi Agreement (1973) on population transfers. Later accords include the 1988 Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement, annual nuclear-facility exchange lists from 1992, the Lahore Declaration (1999), the 2003 cease-fire understanding, transport links, and the 2001 Agra Summit attempt—each reflecting renewed but fragile confidence.

Despite these initiatives, four full-scale wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999) and persistent crises such as Siachen, cross-border terrorism, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks underscore the limits of existing CBMs.

### Literature review.

This historical review traces the evolution of these agreements, evaluates their impact on bilateral stability, and analyses why promising measures often succumb to recurring tensions. By examining developments from the Karachi Agreement to the Mumbai attacks, the study

illuminates both the promise and the constraints of CBMs in transforming one of the world's most enduring rivalries. The historical progression of CBMs between India and Pakistan reflects a complex trajectory, beginning with the Karachi Agreement of 1949. Scholars such as Wirsing (1998) and Cohen (2002) identify this period as the foundation of bilateral agreements focused on delineating borders and reducing military miscalculations. The Tashkent Agreement (1966) and Simla Agreement (1972) marked crucial stages where both countries recognized the need for dialogue, though often under external mediation or post-conflict compulsion.

The literature further details the evolution of CBMs during the 1980s and 1990s, including nuclear risk reduction measures and hotline establishments. According to Cheema (1993) and Chari et al. (2003), the Lahore Declaration (1999) was a high point, with both nations committing to refrain from nuclear aggression and enhance communication. However, the progress was soon derailed by the Kargil conflict, revealing the fragility of trust.

From a historical lens, the durability of these agreements has been inconsistent. Each phase of progress was often followed by major disruptions, such as the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Scholars like Fair (2008) and Tellis (2009) argue that the recurrence of crises has undermined the institutionalization of CBMs, making them reactive rather than preventive.

Furthermore, there is an observed pattern where agreements are made during periods of international scrutiny or pressure, but their implementation falters due to lack of political will, bureaucratic inertia, or shifts in military posturing. The review of literature suggests that while CBMs have played a role in avoiding full-scale wars post-1971, their potential as transformative peacebuilding tools remains underutilized.

### **Research Design**

To trace the evolution and impact of Indo-Pak CBM agreements from 1949-2008, the study adopts a mixed-method approach. Qualitative analysis reconstructs the chronology and context of agreements; quantitative surveys gauge contemporary perceptions of their legacy. Qualitative inquiry remains the principal component.

### **Qualitative Rationale**

Historical CBM analysis requires detailed contextual interpretation; expert interviews provide nuanced insights into treaty implementation and setbacks. Public opinion data complement historical findings, revealing how past agreements influence current attitudes toward Indo-Pak cooperation.

### **Exploratory Orientation**

Few works comprehensively cover CBM evolution across six decades; thus, the study fills a notable gap, particularly in South-Asian diplomatic scholarship.

### **Descriptive and Explanatory Focus**

The research catalogues agreements from the Karachi (1949) to the Mumbai-attacks era (2008), describing their content and explaining factors that advanced or hindered their impact.

### **Data Collection**

Primary sources mirror Article 1:

Interviews: Five domain experts.

Surveys: 75 respondents across the same three universities.

Secondary sources include treaties, governmental documents, books, journals, newspapers, and reputable online archives.

### **Sampling Procedures**

Purposive expert selection yields depth on historical agreements; stratified non-probability sampling secures varied survey viewpoints.


### Instrument Design

The identical 20-item, five-point Likert-scale questionnaire—framed around CBM agreements—ensures comparability while capturing perceptions of long-term impact.

### Data Analysis

Quantitative data were coded and analysed in SPSS v25 for frequency distributions; qualitative data underwent thematic coding. Data screening verified accuracy.

### Chart: Research Design



### Results and Discussion

#### Expert Reflections on Historical CBM Agreements

The same five interviews offer insights into the perceived effectiveness of Indo-Pak CBM agreements over six decades.

#### Persistence of Hostility Despite Agreements

Respondents agreed that successive CBMs—from the Karachi Agreement (1949) to post-Lahore initiatives—have not prevented cyclical crises. All noted that relations “have never been good” and often fluctuate “from bad to worse.”

#### Kashmir as an Unresolved Legacy Issue

Kashmir emerged universally as the “core issue.” Interviewees portrayed it as the chief

impediment to durable gains from past CBMs, describing it as the “incomplete agenda of Partition.”

### **Assessment of Earlier CBMs**

Although past measures (e.g., cease-fire lines, hotlines, transport links) provided temporary relief, experts argued that implementation faltered whenever underlying disputes resurfaced. Mazhar Abbas emphasised that many earlier CBMs require “restoration” before new ones can be added.

### **Future CBM Needs**

All respondents endorsed additional CBMs—particularly renewed dialogue, expansion of people-to-people initiatives, and strengthened cease-fire mechanisms—as prerequisites for translating historical agreements into lasting peace.

### **Implications**

The interviews suggest that historical CBM frameworks laid since 1949 retain relevance but lack durability in the absence of progress on core political disputes. Expert consensus points to the need for restoring and deepening earlier agreements while institutionalising new CBMs to offset recurring crises up to and beyond the Mumbai attacks of 2008.

### **Seventy-One Years of Unfulfilled Potential**

Regional stakeholders consistently favour a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, yet structural mistrust persists. Massive defense budgets coexist with widespread poverty—evidence that historical agreements have not translated into socio-economic dividends.

### **Lessons from Comparative Integration**

European Union (1957–present) – Centuries of warfare ended when European states institutionalized cooperation. Although the CBM label did not exist, the EU’s success exemplifies the cumulative effect of treaties that replaced hostility with free movement and economic interdependence.

U.S.–North Korea (2018) – A single high-level summit produced commitments on normalization and security guarantees, underscoring how bold, top-down initiatives can revive stalled diplomatic tracks.

North–South Korea – Dialogue between ideologically opposed Korean states shows that even protracted adversaries can reorient relations when economic realities outweigh military posturing.

### **Relevance for Indo-Pak Agreements**

Historic Indo-Pak CBMs—from the Karachi Agreement (1949) to the Lahore Declaration (1999)—mirror early European and inter-Korean steps, but implementation failures have prevented cumulative trust. The Kartarpur Corridor (2018) represents a modern extension of this lineage, suggesting that people-to-people initiatives can refresh dormant agreements.

### **Implications for Future Frameworks**

Comparative evidence indicates that India and Pakistan could revitalize SAARC and negotiate transit corridors akin to EU internal markets. Robust CBMs—trade facilitation, religious tourism corridors, and demilitarized border arrangements—remain crucial for converting historic treaties into lasting peace.

### **Historical Results**

#### **Elite Perspectives on Post-1949 Agreements**

The same five experts characterized seventy-plus years of CBMs as “initiative without institutionalization.” They praised landmark accords Indus Waters (1960), Simla (1972),

Non-Nuclear Aggression (1991), and Lahore (1999)—yet stressed that the Kashmir impasse repeatedly stalled cumulative trust.

### Public Perception of CBM Effectiveness

Survey responses show that Pakistan's educated youth broadly:

- Acknowledge existing treaties (Water, cease-fire, nuclear pacts) as products of mutual trust (47 / 75 agree);
- Desire further treaties to deepen confidence (61 / 75 agree);
- Believe CBMs can end conflict (61 / 75 agree);
- Support economic and cultural linkages—free trade (64 / 75) and scholarships (66 / 75) as next-generation CBMs.

### CBM Milestones, 1997-2008, in Historical Context

Placing the 1997-2008 measures against the broader timeline reveals three patterns:

Era	Representative CBMs	Lasting Impact
1949-1972	Karachi Agreement, Indus Waters, Simla Accord	Border demarcation; water cooperation
1980-1996	Non-Nuclear Aggression, hotlines	Nuclear restraint architecture
1997-2008	Lahore Declaration, 2003 cease-fire, missile-test and nuclear-risk pacts	Formalised risk-reduction regime

The 1997-2008 cluster added granular risk-reduction mechanisms an evolutionary leap beyond earlier, broad-brush treaties.

### Discussion

Historical evidence underscores a stop-start trajectory, each breakthrough (e.g., Indus Waters; Lahore) is followed by political or security shocks (e.g., 1965 war; Kargil; Mumbai). Interviewees attribute this volatility to unresolved core disputes and weak implementation. Survey data, however, indicate significant popular appetite for deeper cooperation. To convert episodic CBMs into durable peace, future agreements must embed accountability and expand to socio-economic domains trade, education, and cultural exchange thereby insulating diplomatic progress from crisis cycles.

### Recommendations.

- **Reinvigorate Treaty Compliance** Implement and monitor all clauses of existing CBMs especially the 2003 LoC cease-fire—to restore credibility to earlier agreements.
- **Expand the CBM Agenda** Move beyond nuclear-risk reduction to include routine military-to-military contacts, maritime coordination, and advance notification of major exercises.
- **Promote Socio-economic Linkages** Introduce scholarship schemes and cultural exchanges to fill the current void in educational and artistic cooperation.
- **Facilitate Trade Corridors** Offer customs concessions and permit Pakistani and Indian firms to invest across borders, thereby translating economic interdependence into political stability.
- **Use Track-Two Channels** Regular cricket tours and media collaborations can complement official negotiations by humanising “the other side.”



- Collaborate on Counter-terrorism A bilateral framework to combat terrorism would address a shared security menace and bolster confidence in security cooperation.
- Reassess Defence Budgets Mutual limits on major weapons purchases would ease fiscal pressure and demonstrate genuine commitment to peace.

### Conclusion

The evolution of Indo-Pak confidence-building agreements reveals that relations between the two nations have remained fragile since independence, largely due to a persistent lack of trust. Despite several major treaties such as the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), Simla Agreement (1966), and the Non-Nuclear Aggression Treaty (1991), mistrust and minimal political will have hindered lasting peace. Positive initiatives from Pakistan, including granting MFN status and efforts to resume cricket ties, were often met with limited response from India. Frequent ceasefire violations, especially post-2016 under the BJP government, and negative media portrayal—particularly by Indian outlets—have further strained ties. The absence of people-to-people contact, cultural exchanges, and educational collaboration has deepened the divide. The period from 1997 to 2008 was pivotal, featuring both hope and conflict, including the Lahore Declaration, Kargil War, Agra Summit, and Mumbai Attacks. These events underscore the complex and often contradictory trajectory of confidence-building efforts between India and Pakistan.

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