

ROLE OF RIGHT WING POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICS: ANALYZING NEW TRENDS AND PATTERNS FOR FUTURE

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Abstract

Islamization has returned to be the dominant state ideology in Pakistan over the past few years. this era coincides with the political status of the military-dominated regime after the overthrow of the Pakistan People's Party's government by the military dictator Zia ul Haq in May 1977. Because of this coincidence, one is also tempted to elucidate away the status of Islamization as yet another example of the instrumental use of Islam by a regime so as to determine its political legitimacy. However, to take such a view leads us to ignore or minimize the role of social and political forces outside the military which have played a decisive (perhaps even the determinant) role in establishing Islamization as the state ideology in Pakistan. These social and political forces have after all used the military institution for political functions so as to get access to extra-constitutional powers provided by law in a shot to alter basically the political structure of the state. The objective of this article is to examine these forces in some detail. More specifically, it will seek to explore the nature and determinants of Islamization and its consequences.

Keywords: *Islamization, military regimes, religious factions, military wings, madrassahs, street power.*

INTRODUCTION

Though the religious parties were routed within the 2008 elections, they continue to be well organized, retain a committed activist base and may still impede important reforms. whereas now not in power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan, as they were from 2002 to 2007, their influence on some major national problems, notably Islamic legislation, remains vital. As such, their role within the polity shouldn't be unnoticed, although their electoral strength is restricted. Through their ultra-orthodox and exclusionary ideologies, the religious parties coated during this report are, for the most part, to blame for the religious intolerance, sectarian violence, and aggressiveness that threatens the protection of the Pakistani subject and also the state. By law, Muslims alone will hold the very best constitutional offices of president and prime minister. whereas this clause discriminates against non-Muslim voters, Pakistan is constitutionally a liberal democracy, not a theocratic state. An estimated ninety-six percent of Pakistan's population is Muslim, around 75-80 percent Sunni and 15-20 percent Shia Islam. Sunnis are more divided into four broad categories: Bareilvis, Deobandis, Ahle Hadith and Hanafi. (Jawed, 2010)

The six-party Islamic alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), was unable to compete with the mainstream moderate parties within the 2008 polls, Yet, the Islamic parties, notably the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazl-ur-Rehman (JUI-F), however additionally the Jamaat-Islami (JI), stay vital political entities due to their ability to mobilize street power, their influence on public institutions, as well as major universities, and, within the JUI-F's case, sizeable pockets of support in some Pashtun-majority districts, notably in KPK and Baluchistan. Equally vital, they're ready to leverage a legal and judicatory that, due to earlier Islamization programs, provides the Islamist lobby with a strong political equipment. what is more, the Muslim parties have, linking up with anti-government forces corresponding to Imran Khan's Tehreek-i-Insaaf, joined street protests to oust the Nawaz's regime? General perceptions concerning increasing conservatism in Pakistan, notably after the assassinations of the Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, in January 2011 and also the central government's minority affairs minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, two months later, for opposing the blasphemy laws,

are up to now uncorroborated. they're on no account mirrored in any visible increase in religious parties' popularity. Nevertheless, several religious, notably Deobandi, parties are the beneficiaries of an environment of rising Islamist militancy. Even historically additional moderate Bareilvi politics has become progressively militant: in 2009, several Bareilvi parties, as well as the Jamiat-eUlema Asian nation (JUP), aligned with the militant Sunni Tehreek to ascertain a coalition referred to as the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), that powerfully opposes any amendments to discriminatory blasphemy laws and supports Governor Taseer's assassin. The Ahle Hadith, an ultra-orthodox, puritanical sect impressed by Sunni militant belief, has benefited from the next rate of conversion over the past few decades, however, its main organization, the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith, remains removed from important and so smitten by alliances. The Ahle Hadith sect has shut links with several terrorist outfits, most notably the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, that was the defendant for the Nov 2008 Mumbai attacks.(Riaz, 2010)

Shia Islam politics, too, became additional extreme. Shia Islam parties were shaped throughout the Eighties in response to the Islamization drive of General Zia-ul-Haq, the strongman of the amount, and drew support from the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini revolution in neighboring Iran. However, with zeal for an Iran-like Shia Islam revolution subsiding, they're currently trying to recast themselves as thought Muslim parties, instead of minority sectarian actors. Above all, Shia Islam militancy and political activism are primarily a response to Deobandi political orientation. An Islamic takeover in Pakistan is very unlikely, whether or not through militant violence or the ballot box. However, the religious parties are ready to pressure governments, through parliamentary and infrequently violent street politics, they'll still hinder important democratic reforms, so reinforcing an environment within which religious intolerance, law enforcement, and militancy thrive, the rule of law continues to deteriorate, and elected governments are unable to stabilize.

This paper examines the role and impact of smaller religious parties additionally demand scrutiny, notably their ability to mobilize on the streets and on campuses, moreover as their links, very similar to the terrorist group and also the JUI-F, to militant outfits. It more explores the link with the state, notably with the military, in order to assess how they maintain political influence despite limited electoral support.

Literature review

Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan (1983) composed by Akbar S. Ahmed, Akbar Salahuddin Ahmed. The writer focuses on the increase of a religious leader and Mullah in Waziristan who challenges the writ of a country. These Mullah challenge the writ of the country isn't new; however modern Muslim society's intensive concern over these conflicts explains that the impact of faith in an exceedingly basic rigid society experiencing modernization is larger than several researchers have expected (Ahmed & Ahmed, 1983). *Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Srilanka* (1992) composed by Douglas Allen. According to the author, one among the foremost melodramatic and astonishing developments of the last twenty years was the propagation of violent political activities connected to religion. This book examines the interaction of religion and politics in largely Hindu India, Buddhist Srilanka, and Muslim Pakistan (Allen, 1992). *The Deadly Embrace: faith, Politics, and Violence in India and Pakistan, 1947-2002* (2007) composed by Ian Talbot. According to the writer, the relation between politics, religion, and aggression may be a disputable and pressing concern within the lifetime of the sub-continent. This study makes an attempt to unravel a number of these connections by means that of a series of elaborated historical case studies that cowl the time from 1947 till 2002 (Talbot, 2007).

Islam's Political Culture: faith and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan (2010) composed by Nasim Ahmed Jawed. the author explains the political facet of religion especially Islam in pre-divided Pakistan (1947-1971), one among the primary new Muslim state to commit itself to a Muslim political order and one within which the national discussion on Muslim, ideologic and political matters has been the foremost determined, focused, and wealthy of any conversations within the modern Muslim world (Jawed, 2010). *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (2010) composed by Ali Riaz. In this book the writer explains the particular environments of every state area unit dissimilar, in current years, religion, religious-political parties, and non-secular claptrap became leading options of the political divisions all told six countries. The contributors supply an intensive examination of those developments by giving every state social group and therefore the socioeconomic atmosphere inside that the relations area unit happening (Riaz, 2010). *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Muslim Parties, Political Violence, and political theory in Pakistan* (2013) composed by Haroon K Ullah. In this book, the author explains the political extremism that formed through the dishonorable construct of the teaching of Islam in Pakistan. The extremist area unit the foundation reason behind the matter that should be eradicated from the mind of the Pakistan individuals (Ullah, 2013). *Jamaat-E-Islami women in Pakistan: Vanguard of a brand-New Modernity* (2013) composed by Amina Jamal. The author draws feminist scholarly and political courtesy towards the women protestors of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a significant movement of Muslim regeneration and reform in South Asia. during this anthropology and rhetorical analysis, the author observes the experiences of those feminine from 2002 to 2008 once vital numbers of Jamaat girls came to beat leadership positions inside Pakistani country structure (Jamal, 2013). *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim country and World Politics* (2014) composed by Ayesha Jalal. in an exceedingly inquiring story of her hometown, Ayesha Jalal provides one insider's valuation of however the nuclear-armed Muslim nation of Pakistan progressed into a rustic weak by military domination and aggressive religious political theory and explains why its issues weigh therefore seriously on prospects for peace within the region (Jalal, 2014). *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Supreme Being, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Supreme Being, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (2015) composed by Hassan Abbas the writer explains the increase of religious parties and their extremist views toward jihad against America and different western forces to govern the religious emotions of layman, preponderantly since from independence, and examines its connections to the military of Pakistan shared interests and Pakistan relations with America. It adds profiles of leading Pakistani extremist teams with details of their backgrounds, capabilities and their developments (Abbas, 2015). *Pakistan under Siege: Exterism, Society, the State* (2018) composed by Madiha Afzal. The writer outlines the views of individuals of Pakistan on militant groups, their behavior toward the religious minorities, and therefore the jihad constructs, on the role of America in Pakistan, and on their place within the world. The views don't seem to be aggressive and rigid initially, however, riddled with conspiracy theories (Afzal, 2018).

Islamization and the State

Islamization first emerged as an emerging state policy under the Pakistan People Party led by the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77). Bhutto used affectional religious phrases like Musawat-i-Muhammadi (the equality of Muhammad) and Islami Musawat (Islamic equality) as a part of his political rhetoric to justify and win mass support for the socialist policies of his government. His government was additionally accountable in 1974 for yielding to the decades-long campaign that the followers of the Ahmadiyya sect think about their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad a prophet, and so rejected one in every of the pillars of Islam that Muhammad was the ultimate prophet of God. when parliament passed a law declaring the

Ahmadiyya sect a non-Muslim minority, following the provisions within the 1973 Constitution that needed that each president and prime minister be Muslims, the oath of workplace was amended to incorporate the affirmation of the conclusiveness of Muhammad's prophethood. (Ahmed & Ahmed, 1983)

The Islamization program of the Zia ul Haq's regime is qualitatively totally different from that of the previous government. The Zia regime prohibited political parties and detained many opposition leaders and activists, whereas fostering politics formed for the most part by native, tribal, ethnic and religious concerns. Zia's eleven-year rule additionally entrenched Islamisation, with in-depth reforms to the constitution and law to form orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam the state ideology. Under the Zia regime, the military's relationship with the JI and other conservative Islamic parties deepened at the expense of moderate Islamic actors like the Barelvi JUP. Islamic injunctions and jurisprudence were guided by the JI and the Deobandi ulama.

In return for countering opposition to the military, the JI was also allowed to extend its influence to the bureaucracy, judiciary, and public universities. Party members and sympathizers were appointed to powerful posts in each institution. The Islamisation of the legal and judicial processes and the JI presence in state and educational institutions remain fundamental to the party's political influence, even as it has lost much of whatever electoral strength it once had. Cold War dynamics favored General Zia's domestic preferences. As a frontline ally of the U.S. in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, the military received billions of dollars in military and economic assistance that was given to radical Islamic groups. Madrasas that served as avenues of recruitment and indoctrination for the jihad mushroomed, and the Islamic parties, particularly the JUI-F and the JI, became critical intermediaries between the military and the foot soldiers fighting the Soviets. According to a former member of the JI's student wing, the JI and JUI, by calling for jihad not only against the Soviets but also the Soviet-backed Najibullah government, advanced new tactics of attacks against other Muslims, a precursor to the inward-oriented extremism of militant outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Pakistani Taliban groups today. (Jamal, 2013)

When seizing power in October 1999, the Musharraf military regime extensively square-rigged the 2002 elections to sideline its political opposition, spearheaded by the PPP and also the PML-N. With the military's active support, the six-party Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), electioneering on the twin problems with social control of law and opposition to the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, emerged because the third largest party within the National Assembly, behind the PPP and Musharraf's Islamic Republic of Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q); composed mainly of PML-N defectors, it achieved a majority in Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and shared power with the PML-Q in Baluchistan.

POLITICAL IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PARTIES

A. THE LEGACY OF MILITARY RULE

1. Legal reforms

As seen, the religious parties have exerted influence on legislation and government policy even throughout the civilian rule, parenthetically victimization pressure techniques to get the Objectives Resolution of 1949, the 1974 constitutional modification declaring Ahmadi non-Muslim and also the introduction of prohibition in 1976. whereas these measures bold religious parties to agitate for more reforms, their most vital impact on the polity resulted from their alliance with Zia's military regime. The influence of the parties and ulema today is essentially owed to the way within which that regime basically altered the structure of the constitution and system, giving religious forces new sources of influence and

a political role disproportionate to their standard support. an outsized a part of the religious parties' modern agenda is to forestall a rollback of these reforms.

In 1979, the hudud Ordinances were promulgated to introduce Islamic punishments for theft, alcohol consumption, sexual intercourse outside of marriage ("fornication") and, until the Women Protection Act of 2006, rape. In 1982 and 1986, the regime added discriminatory blasphemy provisions to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan legal code. whereas the first blasphemy law, supported colonial India's legal code, prohibited "deliberate and malicious acts meant to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs", a replacement clause caught up immurement for anyone who "willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran or uses it in any disparaging manner". Another obligatory the executing on anyone who, "by words, either spoken or written, or by visible illustration, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad". (Ullah, 2013)

These changes powerfully discriminate against religious or sectarian minorities, moving the Islamic Republic of Pakistan far away from international standards of justice. Police officials admit that religious groups pressure them into lodging blasphemy charges. Lower courts particularly propagate slim and discriminatory Islamic jurisprudence. Most blasphemy and hudud cases end in convictions at the trial-court level, though they're usually turned on the charm to a tribunal. Radical clerics and extremist outfits such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba have exploited blasphemy cases to promote their sectarian agenda, frequently appearing at hearings to pressure judges into pronouncing guilty verdicts. Intimidation also occurs at higher levels of the justice system. In October 1997, a Lahore High Court judge who acquitted a teenager accused of blasphemy was shot dead in his chamber. After awarding the death penalty to Mumtaz Qadri, Governor Taseer's assassination, the anti-terrorism court judge was forced into a leave of absence and virtual exile due to death threats from Qadri's supporters. The government should ensure a high level of protection not just to judges but also to prosecutors, witnesses and the accused in such cases.

In 1980, a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established and sceptor not solely to strike down laws that were thought-about un-Islamic, however additionally to direct parliament on the content of specific legislation. In 1981, for example, it supported the penalty of death by lapidation. Such reforms gave the ulema opportunities to translate individual interpretations of Sunni Islam into state policy even when Zia's death in 1988 and also the finish of his military government. In 1990, the FSC dominated that a blasphemy conviction ought to carry a compulsory executing, with no risk of pardon. In 1992, it dominated that the Qisas and Diyat laws, which permit a party to seek financial compensation from another once murder has occurred, ought to additionally enable the immediate relatives of a murder victim to pardon the culprit. In November 1991, the FSC command that the interest-based financial set-up was unIslamic which laws relating to interest would stop.(Abbas, 2015)

2. Militant wings

If the main Sunni religious parties were able to stake military support into important legislative gains, their ability to defend these gains through violence, intimidation and street power reflects a committed hardcore base, likewise because of the thought moderate parties' failure to take advantage of their own abundant larger standard bases to support their reform agendas. The JI and JUI, in their pursuit of jihad in Afghanistan against not only the Soviets but also the Soviet-backed Najibullah government, advanced new tactics for attacks against other Muslims, a precursor to the inward-oriented extremism of militant outfits such as the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Pakistani Taliban groups. The Hizbul Mujahideen, formed in November 1989 as a Kashmir-oriented outfit, is the JI's militant wing, waging violent

jihād for Jammu and Kashmir's integration into Pakistan and Islamisation of the disputed state. It also has close links to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-Islami. Analysts believe that the Hizbul Mujahideen's leadership is decided in consultation with the JI. The JI also helps recruit and train combatants for the cause, including through its student wing, and provides funding through various domestic and international foundations. Both JUI factions have backed other India-oriented Deobandi militant groups, particularly the Harkat-mujahideen and its offshoot, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, with JUI madrasas providing recruits for them.

In March 2007, militants from numerous outfits such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and SSP, along with female militants from a women's madrasah, the Jamia Hafsa, occupied the premises of Islamabad's Lal Masjid (Red Mosque). The mosque's leader, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, and his brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, established their own law court and demanded that shariah law is implemented within the capital. A months-long standoff with the state culminated within the Musharraf government's belated, heavy-handed operation to retake the masjid in July 2007, that anti-terrorism officials and other observers believe marked a turning point within the step-up of terrorist attacks within the country. Initially, the JI and the JUI-F argued that the final premise of the Lal Masjid protests was legitimate but the citizens mustn't challenge the government's writ and take state policy into their own hands. Later on, however, JI leader Qazi Hussein termed the events a "positive step" toward the enforcement of Sharia in Pakistan. (Jawed, 2010)

Most Afghan Taliban leaders and commanders, as well as Mullah Mohammed Omar, were graduates of JUI madrasas, that formed jihadi networks across Pakistan's urban centers throughout and when the anti-Soviet jihād. The government makes an attempt to manage the madrasah sector having failed, these seminaries still operate unrestrained, several with legendary or suspected links to militant groups, and to evangelize native, regional and multinational jihād. The JUI-F, likewise as JUI-S powerfully back the Afghan Taliban, with their madrasah network within the Pashtun majority belts of KPK and Baluchistan providing foot troopers for the cause. The JUI-F, and JUI-S, additionally maintain links with Pakistani Taliban groups, several of whose leaders are, like their Afghan counterparts, associated with their madrasas.

Moreover, the JUI actively encourages sectarianism as a basic purpose of principle, linking Shias to anti-Islamic foreign forces. As early as 1978, for example, an editorial in Al-Haq, a publication of JUI-S's Dar-ul- Uloom Haqqania, declared:

"We must also remember that Shias consider it their religious duty to harm and eliminate the Ahle-Sunnah, the Shias have always conspired to convert Pakistan into a Shia state. They have been conspiring with our foreign enemies and with the Jews. It was through such conspiracies that the Shias masterminded the separation of East Pakistan and thus satiated their thirst for the blood of the Sunnis".

The Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba, formed in 1985 with a one-point anti-Shia agenda, was the logical extension of the JUI's sectarian politics, additionally depicted a Pakistani military and Saudi-sponsored campaign against what they perceived as an Iran-friendly the Shia minority. In response, new radicalized Shias created a militant organization, the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), the basic cognitive process that their political parties were inadequate to guard them. Since the early Nineties, the SMP has been concerned in anti-Deobandi violence, notably in Punjab and in Sindh's capital, Karachi. Its relationship to the Shia political parties is unclear, with some analysts claiming that ITP maintains a "discreet distance" from the cluster while not "explicitly condemnatory its militancy". The smaller religious parties, too, have shut links to militant outfits, most notably the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith. Its leader, Sajid Mir, frequently attends and addresses Jamaat-ud-Dawa rallies and events. (Talbot, 2007)

B. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLITICS

1. Parliament and the political mainstream

Even throughout civilian dispensations, the religious parties are ready to back tiny victories into political gains in parliament, for the most part as a result of governments led by the two major mainstream parties, the PPP and the PML-N, have usually had to have faith in fragile coalitions to keep up a majority. This can be significantly the case with the JUI-F, that retains pockets of support in KPK and Baluchistan. let's say, throughout Benazir Bhutto's second government (1993-1996), Fazl-ur- Rehman served, with the PPP's support, as chairman of the parliamentary commission for foreign affairs. once the breakup of the PPP-PML-N coalition in August 2008, the JUI-F leveraged its support to a now-fragile PPP-led majority to shield its political interests however additionally to advance its ideologic interests. reciprocally for supporting Asif Ali Zardari's presidential election in August 2008, the JUI-F with success demanded that the govt open the Jamia Farida madrasah, closed 2007 for its role within the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) affair, and transfer the land of the associated women madrasah, Jamia Hafsa, to the Lal Masjid Action Committee. The PPP-led government additionally appointed Maulana Sherani, associate ultraorthodox JUI-F legislator with questionable tutorial credentials and account as chairman of the Council of Muslim Ideology in 2010, replacing, a moderate religious scholar. This was done despite a conflict of interest since Sherani makes recommendations to the Senate on laws because the CII chairman, whereas as a legislator he espouses his party's political agenda. Sherani has repeatedly demanded the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to be dominated by law and a mistily outlined Muslim Nizam (system). "Islam applies to the state, even as it applies to individuals", he argues. "It isn't attainable to relegate Islam solely to the non-public sphere".

In April 2011, the PPP reportedly tried to steer the JUI-F to come to the governing coalition in Islamabad, however, the party's conditions, as well as ending military operations against militant groups in FATA and imposing law, were unacceptable. Yet, even on the opposition benches, the JUI-F remains a force within the general assembly, for the most part, attributable to posts given by the PPP once it had been a coalition partner. Different religious parties have additionally relied on alliances with the two major mainstream parties to influence parliamentary politics. maybe, the Ahle Hadith, whereas maintaining its own mandate and religious agenda, was aligned with the PML-N. the associate analyst describes it as PML-N's "B team". Even once it had been a part of the MMA, its Ameer, Professor Sajid Mir, contested the 2002 polls on a PML-N ticket. (Jalal, 2014)

The PML-N's concessions to the religious parties have undermined its credibility and record in office in the past. The first Sharif government, for example, made the death penalty mandatory in blasphemy cases in 1991, albeit following a Federal Shariat Court judgment on the issue. In 1997, the second Sharif government passed the Qisas and Diyat laws that allow a murder victim's heirs to pardon the culprit in return for financial compensation. It additionally introduced the Fifteenth Constitutional modification bill in 1998, that demanded the law to become the fundamental law of the land, however, did not gain parliamentary approval attributable to the PPP-led opposition. These concessions to and alliances of convenience with the religious parties, as well as the allocation of electoral seats to members of parties, appreciate the Ahle Hadith, may bring short-term electoral gains, however, area unit short-sighted, with the party risking losing credibility with its core supporters. Moreover, since groups just like the Ahle Hadith oppose key PML-N objectives such as peace with India, yielding area to them limits the party's policy choices.

Similarly, the PPP's concessions to religious forces have resulted in inconsistent messaging that damages the party's standing and restricts its policy decisions. These embrace the imposition of law through the Nizam-e-Adal 2009 in KPK's Malakand region. Such

policies of calming have solely served to empower the militants additional, as their comeback to the region amply demonstrates. Invoking Article 256 of the constitution, the govt ought to additionally need religious parties to disband their militant wings, and take sturdy action against people who refuse, as well as disabling them from taking part in elections. Likewise, it ought to introduce strict punishments for false accusations of blasphemy or crimes underneath the sharia law Ordinances and act, underneath existing laws, against all types of vigilantism.(Afzal, 2018)

2. Mass mobilization

Senate's chairman Sherry Rehman argues that the religious parties have wanted the advantages of state patronage whereas adopting the language associated methodology of an opposition. At the same time, they need disproportionately influenced domestic policy, not simply through alliances with military regimes, however additionally through the utilization of street power and violence, usually with success pressuring civilian governments into abandoning secure reforms or creating concessions that forward associate religious agenda. Their reliance on such suggests that to realize power and influence is basically settled by their lack of a preferred support base that extends on the far side a restricted hardcore body. neither is this base seems to expand at this time, given their current specialize in a slim anti-Western platform or appeals to orthodox Islam. Such associate agenda has very little mass charm, not simply with the growing numbers of urban lower-middle and bourgeois citizens, however, even a lot of signs with those of modest suggests that for whom economic considerations area unit and certain can stay the very best priority within the next election.

Some religious groups are addressing middle-class concerns without engaging economics issues directly. In May 2011, for example, the Sunni Ittihad Council (SIC) control demonstrations in Punjab against extremist attacks on Sufi shrines and therefore the government's inability to prevent them. It drew some support from trade unions in urban and semi-urban districts wherever businesses are littered with sectarian violence. Yet, the SIC was much more winning in drawing its core constituents on to the streets once it controls protests against reforms to the blasphemy laws and in support of Taseer's assassin. Indeed, the religious parties' area more powerful in exciting street power once the goal is narrowly connected to obstructing reforms to discriminatory religious laws that usually provoke sectarian violence and conflict and undermine the rule of law and constitutionalism.(Allen, 1992)

In the aftermath of Asiya Bibi's blasphemy conviction in November 2010, Sherry Rehman introduced a private member bill in the National Assembly to amend the blasphemy law, as well as eliminating the death sentence. Senior leaders, as well as former President Zardari, Governor Taseer, and Minister Bhatti supported such changes. the subsequent month, however, a conference of major religious parties, like JUI-F, JI, and Ahle Hadith, launched the Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat (Protection of the Sanctity of the Prophet) movement, opposing repeal or amendment. The movement has since control many massive demonstrations and strikes, whereas religious party leaders insist that the death penalty is that the solely applicable punishment for blasphemy. Rather than resisting this pressure through debate and mobilizing its own sizeable PPP activist base, the government backtracked publicly, pledging in December 2010 to neither repeal nor amend the blasphemy law. Assuring the ulama on this, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said, "religious leaders must not have any fear and apprehension that anything would be done contrary to Islam or its teachings by the present government". The fear of violent retribution, more than evident in the Taseer and Bhatti assassinations, has understandably caused policymakers to proceed cautiously. Moreover, the judiciary might very possibly obstruct any attempt to amend or repeal such laws, as it has done in the past.(Ullah, 2013)

B. STUDENT POLITICS

Student unions have a vital and constructive role in Pakistan's political history. Military rulers have tried to neutralize this doubtless powerful pro-democracy lobby and forestall domestic opposition with frequent clampdowns on political policy on the campuses. At the same time, military governments have allowed religious parties, significantly the JI but additionally military-backed ethnic entities such as the MQM, free reign in schools and universities. This suppression of democratic dissent has resulted within the student wings of Muslim parties gaining ascendance on campuses to the disadvantage of parties such as the PPP and the PML-N. Most student groups were established shortly after independence and spearheaded democratic protests in each east and west Pakistan. Student protests, let's say, energized the favored movement that led to the ouster of Pakistan's first military government, that of General Ayub Khan, in 1969. In 1984, Zia banned student unions, on the face of it to counter growing violence on campuses however for the most part to forestall the student's wings of the moderate parties from exciting opposition to military rule. Whereas Benazir Bhutto's first government removed the ban, General Musharraf reimposes it on elected student unions, with activists having to sign affidavits that they would not participate in political activities.(Jamal, 2013)

The moderate mainstream parties were therefore prevented from grooming a new generation of potential political leaders, however, the military-backed parties benefited from the ban. The security agencies allowed their student wings, significantly the JI's Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) and MQM's All Muhajir Students Organization (APMSO), to dominate field political activity and conduct their own bitter and violent group action to regulate campuses in urban centers such as Karachi. In March 2008 and following a vote of confidence within the National Assembly, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani declared the restoration of student unions. Progress has, however, been slow. Though some private universities do hold student body elections, public universities area unit still awaiting a political candidate notification to revive the unions. The govt ought to issue it instantly, in order that they will begin to counter the pernicious influence of violent religious factions on the country's campuses. Most of the politically active religious student groups area on the side connected with a parent party. As those parties' splinter, thus to do the connected student unions. The JUP connected Anjuman Talaba Islam, let's say, has members that support JUP-N and others that support JUP-F. In some cases, support from a student cluster will confirm that party faction is going to be the foremost authoritative, as was the case with the Imamia Student Organization's support for the Majlis-e-Wahdatul Muslimeen over the initial Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan. The JI's IJT remains the foremost powerful student group; several of its alumni hold leadership positions within the JI or, having left the party, even among mainstream parties just like the PPP and PML-N.(Talbot, 2007)

C. THE MADRASA SECTOR

Benefiting as they need from the military's support on campuses, the religious parties even have a bonus over the moderate mainstream parties through their ability to recruit from madrasas. Much of the political activism of the four major religious-political parties in Pakistan integrally linked with and draws strength from the madrasas affiliated with their respective schools of theological thought. Whereas the JUI-affiliated student wing, the Jamiat Talaba Islam (JTI), isn't significantly active on university campuses, it commands wide influence in Deobandi madrasas. Acknowledging the JI-affiliated IJT's dominant influence in through student politics, a JUI-S member noted that the JTI plays a vital role wherever it matters within the madrasah sector. As a result, each faction of the JUI stays unaffected by the ban on student unions. There are five distinct madrasah networks, divided into sectarian lines:

- Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabian Peninsula (Deobandi),
- Tanzeem Al Madaris (Barelvi),
- Wafaq Al Madaris Salfia (Ahle Hadith),
- Tanzeem religious order Wafaq Al Madaris (Shia), and
- Rabata-ul Madaris (Jamaat-e-Islami).

Zia's military regime proved a turning point for the madrasah system. During the early years of Zia's Islamisation (1979- 1982), solely 151 new madrasas were established however within the next six years, another 1,000 were established. In 1995 according to an official estimate, 2,010 new madrasas were registered since 1979, the bulk connected with the Deobandis, though Ahle Hadith madrasas additionally grew considerably. Reflective rising, Shia madrasas likewise grew, from seventy in 1979 to one hundred sixteen in 1983-1984. Musharraf's half-hearted pledges to reform the madrasah sector after the 11 September 2001 attacks unsurprisingly made few tangible changes, given his regime's alliance with the Muslim parties. (Abbas, 2015)

Today, the two JUI factions run over sixty-five percent of all madrasas, in the main within the Pashtun-majority KPK and therefore the Pashtun belt of Baluchistan, from that the majority of their party staff and leaders graduate. Samiul Haq's Darul Uloom Haqqania is one among the foremost madrasas supporting militant regional and international jihad. As noted, the majority of the Afghan Taliban leadership, as well as politician, attended it. Students study free and are awarded government-recognized graduate qualifications after eight years. Party leaders claim that money for the madrasah comes from "common Muslims" and supporters, however aware observers, as well as enforcement officials, maintain that the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia still offer vital funding. The program covers Muslim philosophy and logic, Quran, Hadith and fiqh and Arabic descriptive linguistics. In recent years, English, geography, and computer science are introduced as a part of Musharraf's donor-supported madrasah reform endeavor.

Teachers at Darul Uloom Haqqania have a cult-like following. Students kiss instructors' hands, follow their directions blindly and, as in several Pakistani public and personal colleges, don't question the truthfulness of what they're educated. They live very confined lives, while not newspapers or permission to observe tv. though the field hosts an oversized library, it's restricted to students. Sami-ul-Haq has been quoted as saying, "young minds are not for thinking. We catch them for the madrasas when they are young, and by the time they are old enough to think, they know what to think".

Given Maududi's strong criticism of madrasas, and since the JI's main source of support is from a lot of educated urban constituencies, JI leaders are more likely to come from the IJT than the JTA. According to a graduate of the Jamaat madrasah system, IJT members take into account themselves superior to their madrasah counterparts. The precise number of Jamaat-affiliated madrasas is unclear however is assumed to be 850, the majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Unlike Deobandi or Ahle Hadith madrasas, the JI's allow members of any religious fiqh to attend and emphasize the necessity for Muslims to unite and refrain from divisional politics. however, JI-affiliated students usually have the problem of attending madrasas connected with the different school of thought, as these stay suspicious of Maududi's ideology. JI-affiliated madrasas don't seem to be essentially any higher than their Deobandi and Ahle Hadith counterparts. A former JTA member said, "the view by which madrasa students judge the world is a result of the static, outdated and narrow material made available to us. All students believe that Islam has provided the political system to us. Everything else, including political parties, is, therefore, antithetical to the system bestowed upon us by Allah". Thus, students are usually inspired to oppose non-theocratic parties and

governments. Students at JI madrasas are used to campaign in mosques for JI election candidates on a platform that conflates a vote for the JI with a vote for Islam.(Jawed, 2010)

D. ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE MEDIA

The mushrooming of privately-owned cable and satellite channels within the early 2000s has resulted in additional numerous and spirited media comment. This provides opportunities for all political parties to boost their electronic communication, and to strengthen or undermine democratic functioning. Like politicians from all major parties, religious party leaders and sympathizers frequently seem to speak shows and panel discussions within the mainstream electronic media, even if less frequently than their secular counterparts. “I don’t often call religious party figures on my program because their presence in parliament is very limited, so I don’t feel it pertinent”, said a senior journalist who hosts current affairs programs in both Urdu and English on an independent TV channel. Yet, according to another prominent broadcast host, “many tv producers, anchors, and paid commentators don’t seem to be directly connected with the JI, however, either they need being within the past, or are members of the IJT and still have terribly clear sympathies”. maybe, a widely known commentator, Zaid Hamid, was erstwhile associate IJT member and, whereas not a political candidate Islamic Community member, oftentimes emphasizes JI’s political and historic role in Pakistan. Hamid criticizes “Darwinism, liberalism, secularism, freedom of speech, women’s liberation, democracy and capitalism” as having “enslaved humans”. There also are dozens of specifically religious channels, some operated by religious parties. Religious TV programming has increased rapidly over the past few years and clerics, who previously preached morning, noon and night in mosques, now sermonize on the airwaves. Many of the country’s top channels have cultivated their own stylized clerics for prime-time television. For example, in 2010 Ahle Hadith established Paigham (Message) Tv, airing programs to spread Quranic teachings.(Afzal, 2018)

Various religious parties have also embraced social media. Since August 2010, Ahle Hadith’s Paigham (Message) tv uploads video clips to the Youtube.com website, as well as prayers, sermons, and speeches by party leaders, footage of Ahle Hadith-led protests and slideshows of the party’s flood relief efforts. Similarly, JI’s former ameer Munawar Hassan’s YouTube channel, established in November 2009 with many uploads, is updated many times per week. The videos embrace Hassan’s press conferences, speeches, and visits to flood-hit areas. The Namos-e-Risalat movement opposing repeal or reform of the blasphemy laws launched a Facebook page, furthermore as a website. With another national election cycle nearing, and anti-incumbency sentiment high at the central furthermore as provincial level, the thought parties, too, area unit considering victimization social media. maybe, PTI is reportedly getting to use Facebook, Twitter, and different social networking tools to expand stretch, significantly for the youth vote. It is still too early to determine the impact of those comparatively embryonic strategies on the citizens or the broader political method. The transportable usage, net penetration grew comparatively massive from 2008 to 2013. It estimates place it at around eighteen to twenty million users, whereas associate calculable eighty-three million are going to be legible to choose ensuing general elections. A journalist and blogger commented: “People victimization social media are the same as people who have access to English newspapers; this can be a really tiny fraction of our population”. though there are increased numbers of Pakistanis active on several social media networks.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In contemporary time religious parties particularly Sunni orthodox parties, are still the main beneficiaries of the political space provided by military regimes, as well as Zia’s Islamisation process that distorted the legal and judicial systems and Musharraf’s

relinquishing of two of four provinces to the MMA through the rigged 2002 elections. Whereas the religious parties do bid for political power among a parliamentary framework, there are limits to the pragmatism they will enable themselves if they're to retain their hardcore base, because of the MMA's 5 years in power in NWFP incontestable. when they condemn violent attacks on the Pakistani state and voters, political expedience has not tempered extreme positions and rigid ideologies that promote sectarian violence and militancy and deny basic rights. Sectarian politics area unit, in fact, changing into more and more violent, as more religious parties and groups espouse as the most effective method to promote their interests. Indeed, the majority of religious parties are far from abandoning the idea of militant jihad or cutting their ties to native and regional militants, as well as sectarian extremists, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda-linked strain outfits. makes an attempt by the PPP and the PML-N to appease them through concessions or on the grounds of political (including electoral) experience, come back at a high value, setting back efforts to curb intolerance and extremism in Pakistani society.

The present democratic transition is also imperfect and fragile; however, the mainstream moderate parties still retain support within the electorate. Absent large rigging by the military, the electoral prospects of the religious parties stay limited; once any free, honest and democratic election, either the ruling PML-N or the opposition PPP and PTI is probably going to make ensuing government. Rather than yielding area to the mullahs for short-run gain, ensuring government ought to assert management over sensitive policy areas, as well as by strictly prosecuting anyone, as well as clerics and politicians, who violate the law by encouraging and glorifying violence and militant jihad, diffusing militant strain literature or uttering hate speech against religious and sectarian minorities. The government should also need religious parties to disband their militant wings, reform discriminatory spiritual legislation, restrict on illegal extremist outfits and reform the madrasah sector. By doing this, it might stem extremist violence, and by additionally restoring the latter and spirit of the 1973 constitution facilitate to stabilize the democratic transition on that Pakistan's stability depends.

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