

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF ISLAMIZATION UNDER THE ERA OF ZIA UL-HAQ

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Abstract

General Zia Al-Haq imposed Martial Law on July 5, 1977, as a result of the political unrest in Pakistan. Under Zia Al-Haq's leadership (1977–1988), Islamization gained new momentum. He started a comprehensive strategy to purge anything non-Islamic from Pakistani culture and the state. His Islamization effort took into account Pakistan's socioeconomic, legal-constitutional, and educational establishments. The nation embraced the principles of the Islamic udd, the Penal Code, and the Zakt-'Ushr legislation. Riba was outlawed and P&L accounting was implemented in banks as part of the Islamization of the economy. He also created the Federal Shar'at Court, the Shar'at Appellate Benches, and the Shar'ah Council, and renamed parliament Majlis Al-Shr. The enforcement of gambling rules and the encouragement of women to wear headscarves (chadar) are two examples of the social changes brought about by Nizm-e-Mutafi. The reading of the Arabic news was made mandatory, and radio and television programming judged incompatible with Islam was restricted. The establishment of a completely Islamic state in Pakistan was the stated objective of President Zia's Islamization efforts. His political status was bolstered by those who disapproved of his initiatives.

Keywords: Islamization, Political Unrest, Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

In his inaugural address to the Nation, Zia unveiled his Islamization plan, stating, "It shows that Pakistan, which was established in the name of Islam, can only survive if it adheres to Islam." I believe it is imperative that the Islamic system be applied nationwide because of this. In November 1977, Zia resurrected the 1973 constitution's Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) to suggest a comprehensive framework for Shari'ah implementation. According to the constitution, CII's main responsibility was to suggest amendments to the current legislation that would better represent Islamic principles as stated in the Quran and the Sunnah (Abidi, 1988). For the first time, a significant portion of Ulama were assured seats at the CII in 1980, during the Zia administration. Thirdly, Zia established a continuing Law Commission tasked with updating the legal system to better address contemporary issues of social justice and the requirement for effective judicial procedures. Zia's administration still needed to figure out how to apply Shari'ah law, even after other institutions in Pakistan were established or modified. One school of ulema believed that an ordinance would be effective. Others believed that Shariah should be implemented gradually (Ian Talbot, 1988). The removal of banking interest and the creation of Shariah-compliant Islamic banking presented difficulties for specialists in Islamic economics. Organizations like the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and others were investigating different ways to implement Shari'ah. Two years after taking office, on February 10, 1979, Zia said that the current administration has been able to fulfill the desires of the people with Allah's assistance. I can publicly announce the deployment of the Islamic system nationwide today since so much progress has been accomplished in just over a year and a half (Report, 2006).

METHODOLOGY

The study article uses primary and secondary materials from a range of archival works, as well as official and unauthorized sources.

FACTORS BEHIND THE ISLAMIZATION OF ZIA

Every new phenomenon or change has its origins in a combination of events. Pakistan's agenda became more Islamized as a result of a number of intricate causes. The following section outlines Zia's three main objectives of Islamization.

SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION

The split of the subcontinent was opposed by many Muslim and nationalist leaders from the start of the independence struggle. A close friend of Mahatma Gandhi and a member of the Congress Working Committee, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan advocated for the establishment of a distinct state for Pashtuns. Instead of easing the suffering of its citizens, the creation of Pakistan sparked a new wave of grievances (Hamdani, 2009; Khan, 1969; Khan & Ali, 2018). Ethnic-nationalist movements among Bengalis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Baluchis were triggered by the predominance of Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants from northern India in the military corps and civil bureaucracy. When Pakistan was divided in 1971 as a result of the majority Punjabi population's discrimination against and disregard for the nation's minorities, East Pakistan—now known as

Bangladesh—became an independent state in South Asia. Pakistan was always a fabricated state, composed of individuals from a wide range of cultural and ethnic origins (Haqqani, 2005; Iqbal & Nasir, 2018). The bulk of Pakistan's population was united by Islam, yet this was insufficient to stop the inorganic state from disintegrating. When Z.A. Bhutto was prime minister, he faced several challenges. His administration is unconstitutional since Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of one of his coalition parties, recently broke off relations with the federal government. In response, Bhutto overthrew Khan's Balochistan Provincial administration, banned Khan's National Awami Party, and imprisoned its leaders. The military personnel who participated in the attempted coup against Bhutto in 1973 were taken into custody. In March 1977, the Pakistan National Alliance, a coalition of secular and religious political organizations, openly challenged the validity of the election, claiming it had been rigged. The Bhutto government was met with organized protests and various kinds of resistance. According to Mazhar Ali, military coups in Pakistan have traditionally taken place primarily "to defend military's institutional interests" (Aziz, 2008). Zia reportedly placed Bhutto in jail and overthrew her government as a response of the civil unrest. Surendra Chopra states that "Zia saw Islam as the only remedy for the nation's ills and raison d'être of the state as well as the unity and strength of the nation". The coup temporarily put an end to civil turmoil, but within a year, mass movement against the Zia government started. He never held the early election he had promised. He said that even the president of Pakistan is acceptable in this Islamic and theocratic state. He used Islam to legitimize his power, pacify the populace, and mobilize support for his Islamic policies.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND MILITARY RULE

General Zia was aware of Bhutto's persuasive abilities since he organized and led a significant protest against General Ayub Khan's leadership from 1968 to 1970. On the first day of the coup (5 July 1977), Bhutto and his cabinet members were put in jail; nevertheless, he was freed on the 29th. Zia changed his mind after first stating that elections would take place in 90 days. Tens of thousands of fans joined Bhutto on her speaking tour across the nation. The military junta, alarmed by Bhutto's mobilizations, came up with a plan to kill him; Bhutto was detained again and sentenced to death on September 3. Leading Pakistani military analyst Ayesha Siddiqi claims that "Zia skillfully used the Islamization card and religious and ethnic parties — Islami Jamhoori Itehad and Muttahida Quami Movement — to counter the influence of PPP in its stronghold Sindh province" (Siddiqi, 2017). Zia established "Islami Jamhoori Itehad" as a new alliance of political groups in an effort to curtail the PPP's influence and its protracted anti-government demonstrations. Religious groups including Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (P) joined the government to support Zia's Islamization agenda. Even though Bhutto implemented a number of Islamic laws, like banning the sale of alcohol to Muslims, shutting nightclubs, and outlawing horse racing, his attempts to Islamize the nation were opposed by a number of religious organizations. His party's platform was changed from "Food, Shelter, Cloth" to "Islam is our faith, democracy is our policy, and socialism is our economy" after he was widely criticized by religious organizations for his secularist campaign. Religious groups and Zia denounced Bhutto's attempts to Islamize the country, Islamic His party's platform was changed from "Food, Shelter, Cloth" to "Islam is our faith, democracy is our policy, and socialism is our economy" after he was widely criticized by religious organizations for his secularist campaign. Zia and religious groups said socialism is a Kufr and not in line with the spirit of Islam, and they denounced Bhutto's Islamization attempts, Islamic Socialism, and nationalization program following the coup. Zia required all political parties to register with the Election Commission and "provide details of their fundings and expenditures and publish their formal manifesto" when a revised version of the Political Parties Act was passed in August 1979. He gained more authority over political parties as a result of this shift, and the PPP was barred from registering due to its socialist philosophy, which runs against to Islamic principles. "The localization of politics," Zia said (Siddiqi, 2017), "would minimize the significance of PPP." Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z. A. Bhutto, organized the Movement for Restoration of Democracy in 1981 as an alliance of eight political parties to abolish Martial Law and guarantee a free and fair election. This combination may revive widespread support for the PPP, which worried Zia's military regime (Haqqani, 2005). Zia called on his religious supporters to denounce the legitimacy of the PPP party and proclaim socialism to be Kufr. Later, Zia said that elections would be held without regard to party affiliation and that he would transfer some of his power to local organizations. The bulk of PPP supporters won the seats in the election, despite Zia's several unsuccessful attempts to use the Islamic card against his political rivals in an effort to eradicate and cut them off from Pakistan's political landscape. The Pakistan People's Party, however, continues to be a significant force in national politics in spite of his activities. Zia could have been able to increase his authority through the Islamization strategy. He could stifle political opposition and manage the

public discourse by allying with religious organizations and enforcing Sharia law, guaranteeing his continued supremacy.

TO REINFORCE NATIONAL IDENTITY

The debate about the destiny of Muslims in British India had been going on for decades before Pakistan gained its independence in 1947. Pakistan has not yet developed an Islamic government, despite being created as a homeland for Muslims on the Indian subcontinent. The concept of an Islamic state served as the foundation for Pakistan's philosophy, but since gaining its independence, the nation has grappled with its own identity. According to Pervez A. Hoodbhoy (1986), Jinnah's vision for Pakistan's future included a democratic state with equal rights for Muslims and a homeland for Hindus. Jinnah's vision, which erodes Pakistan's national identity, caused many talks on the future of statecraft and identity to be delayed until 1956. Many people in Pakistan found the 1971 breakup of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to be psychologically upsetting. Pakistan's statehood and national identity, Pakistani ideology, and the Two-Nation Theory were all closely examined. Islam was frequently reiterated as a national source of salvation during the 1970s and 1980s, a time when a new national identity was being sought. Indira Gandhi, the former prime minister of India, once said that Bangladesh's independence had put an end to Jinnah's Two Nations Theory. Therefore, in order to revive Pakistan's ideology and prevent a crisis of national identity, General Zia started an Islamization campaign.

Zia's Islamization agenda included economic changes, a new educational approach, the adoption of the Islamic Penal Code, and legal reforms. Karachi (1979) This article attempts to analyze the Islamization of Pakistan under Zia Al-Haq's rule (1977–1988). The impact of Zia's Islamization efforts on Pakistan's political, social, economic, and governmental systems is examined in this article. Questions such as "What was Zia's Islamization policy?" are the main subject of the paper. Did the country's social and economic structures improve as a result of his attempts to Islamize society? What effects did this have on Pakistan's government, judiciary, society, economy, and educational system? And how were his initiatives implemented by different organizations and people around the nation?

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS

Among the several Islamic reforms that were explored for Pakistan under Zia's tenure, legal changes have received the greatest attention and have been embraced the most. Evidentiary and criminal reforms were linked to structure changes, which were already a part of Pakistan's legal institutions; procedural and criminal reforms completed the package (Kennedy, 1999). Pakistan's criminal code was updated and changed on February 10, 1979, when President Zia issued four new legislation known as the udd Ordinances. The purpose of the UDD Ordinance was to bring Pakistani legislation closer to Islamic values. The laws of stealing and zin (adultery) were revised. In keeping with its Islamic purpose, each Ordinance distinguishes between two ideas that are specifically mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah: 'add (limit) and ta'zir (punishment for offenses). For example, you need two adult male witnesses who have not committed any serious crimes if you take more than 4.457 grams of gold from a safe area (Kennedy, 1988). If the evidentiary requirements were satisfied, the accused was punished under ta'zir, which carries a potential fine or jail term. If not, the accused was forced to have his right hand amputated in line with the udd Ordinances. Laiquat Baloch thinks that the Hudood Ordinances' execution was the most notable aspect of Zia's Islamization strategy. These rules signalled a dramatic change in the nation's court system toward Islamic legal principles and contained penalties for theft, adultery, and alcohol usage. The enactment and implementation of Zia's udd Ordinance had hardly any impact on Pakistan's criminal justice system. Many individuals, both inside and outside of Pakistan, were concerned that the severe penalties outlined in the UDD Ordinance—such as hand amputation or stoning death—would become the norm. In a very small number of cases, the Federal Shar'at Court upheld a sentence that was subsequently overturned by higher courts. The udd Ordinance's implementation in Pakistan had little effect on women's position. Likewise, it hasn't had a significant effect on Pakistani court processes or the relationship between the political and judicial branches (Kennedy, 1988). President Zia improved the nation's judicial system as well. Higher courts were augmented with shari'at benches to manage the surge of appeals resulting from the adoption of the udd Ordinance. Four superior courts were given "Shar'at Appellate Benches" during Zia's regime in 1978. Sharia appellate benches were created to review appeals from UDD law convictions and hear Sharia petitions. But these benches were abolished when the Federal Shar'at Court was established (Government of Pakistan, Introduction of Islamic Laws, Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1979; Kennedy, 1988). A Shar'ah Council made up of Ulama was established in addition to the Federal Shar'at Court to examine the nation's constitutions and laws and align them with Islamic values.

In June 1980, an independent Federal Shar'at Court was established in Centre-Islamabad to guarantee that all cases were resolved in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet

Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him)(Kennedy,1999). A 1982 modification to Article 203-D of the Constitution granted the Court the power to act *Suo Moto* in cases where a law or a part of a law seems to conflict with Islamic teachings. Examining any law as specified by Article 203-B(c) and determining whether or not a law or provision of law is in conflict with Islamic injunctions were the duties assigned to the Federal Shar'at Court. To exercise appellate jurisdiction by considering appeals in udd cases when the trial court's sentence of imprisonment exceeds two years; to confirm or issue other appropriate orders about any "add penalty" given by the trial court in udd legislation. Until this is verified, no udd punishment can be applied;

- To exercise temporary authority to rehear any case decided by a criminal court under any act relating to udd implementation.

According to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Federal Shar'at Court has been given the power of a regular civil court to perform its functions. This includes the following: "summon and compel the attendance of any person and examine him on oath; require the discovery and production of any document; receive evidence on affidavits; and issue commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents" (Karachi, 1979).

An appeal from a higher or intermediate court would be heard by the Shari'at Court. The maximum punishment for breaking the blasphemy laws was changed from life in prison to the death sentence. Today, the Federal Shar'at Court is just as powerful as the civil court. The authority to examine court appeals, evaluate Shar'at petitions, and assess whether national laws are incompatible with Islamic principles was granted to the Federal Shar'at Court. The Pakistani Federal Shar'at Court produced about twenty-seven different constitutional changes by March 1985. For many, the most notable aspect was the bolstering of blasphemy laws. Under Zia's rule, these rules were strengthened and the penalties for disparaging Islam were raised, which had serious social and legal ramifications in Pakistan.

ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION

In an attempt to Islamicize Pakistan's economic structure by establishing rules for Islamic finance, leading religious experts were contacted. An ordinance was issued on June 20, 1980, which applies to all Islamic organizations, groups, and institutions in the nation. It collects 'Ushr, a charge or levy on agricultural output, and Zakt, a religious tax requirement for Muslims who reach the required levels of wealth. On the first day of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting, 2.5% of the balances in all Muslim bank accounts over Rs. 3,000 were taken out as Zakt. 10% of the user's agricultural land's total yearly yield was used to compute the charge (Shah, 2012). At the national, provincial, district, and tehsil levels, zakat committees were established to aid the underprivileged. Because of the disparities in Islamic law, Shias groups were exempt from having Zakt taken out of their funds.

Zia's Islamization campaign was opposed by the Shias, "who, buoyed with pride from the Iranian revolution, asserted the validity of their own religious interpretation," since it was founded on the Sunni interpretation of Islamic law and theology. Zia's Islamization agenda was therefore viewed by the Shias sect as a threat to their position in Pakistani society and the government. Shia leaders organized their followers in 1979 and 1980 in opposition to Zia's Sunni Zakt Ordinance. In 2002, Nasr on July 5, 1980, the Zia dictatorship initiated a five-day siege of Islamabad, which compelled them to exempt Shias from Zakt. Following the Shia uprisings, S.V.R. Nasr said that "Zia's Islamization had, in effect, been reduced to 'Sinification,' undermining the entire process' universal Islamic claims."

Ordinances and rules on Zakt, 'Ushr (tithe), the elimination of Riba (interest/usury) from the banking system, mudrabah (profit sharing), profit and loss share, and twelve modalities of Islamic finance were all enacted in an effort to Islamize the Pakistani economy (Hassan and Haque, 1991). The Islamic concept of giving up rib was introduced on January 1, 1980, when Zia ordered the adoption of a "Profit and Loss Sharing" accounting system. The bank's profits and losses were to be divided among the P&L account holders.

Zia's Islamization agenda has taken into account the implementation of Islamic finance as a means of restructuring Pakistan's economy. A new social welfare tax (Zakt) is being collected from Sunni Muslim bank accounts, banks are no longer permitted to charge interest (Rib), and an Islamic land tax ('Ushr) has been implemented. Alongside these developments, several new universities throughout the nation have begun studying Islamic economics. Kennedy (1999) The political plan to Islamize Pakistan's economy during the Zia period produced illusions, misunderstandings, and misconceptions on both an intellectual and practical level. This plan was carried out by the ruling feudal, land-lord, and capitalist elites as well as civilian and military bureaucrats, who saw Islam as a legalistic rite and legitimized the mediaeval socio-religious concept (Haque and Hassan, 1991).

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Nizam-e-Mutafa is recognized for enacting several social changes, such as encouraging women to wear modest clothing (chadar) and enforcing gambling regulations. Kennedy (1999) Zia attacked Pakistan's media as part of his campaign to Islamize the nation. The reading of the Arabic news was made mandatory, and radio and television programming judged incompatible with Islam was restricted. In order to align the Azan with prayer times, it was regularly aired on television and radio five times a day. Islamic law mandated that female anchors wear a headscarf and the pardah when they were on the air.

The Pakistani government has attempted to attract and retain competent professionals from universities and religious institutions by elevating religious academics to the position of commissioned officer in the armed forces. Mosques are becoming more widely distributed throughout the country. A proclamation was issued by the Zia regime to maintain the honor of the holy month of Ramadan. The decree forbade the public eating of food and beverages during the holy month of Ramadan, and anyone who did so risked a fine of Rs. 500 and three months in jail. Additionally, Zia established the Nizam-e-alt initiative to standardize prayer times throughout the nation. Although Pakistan's foundation was always based on Islamic ideas, Zia's Islamization marked a significant change. His policies incorporated Islamic laws more thoroughly than previously, going beyond religious language and symbolic gestures.

The concept of Chadar aur Chaar Devari, which holds that a woman's seclusion is safeguarded by a veil and four walls, was established. As a result, a woman who commits adultery may get lashes. The case would be considered adultery if there were just two witnesses who attested to the rape. The new Law of Evidence now gives the testimony of two women the same weight as that of one male. Female activists protested Zia's regime's Evidence Law in the streets of Pakistan in 1983 under the leadership of the Women Action Forum, a group of women with college degrees. A historic rally resulted from hundreds of women turning out to oppose General Zia's harsh leadership. They were opposing a modification to the Law of Evidence that would have reduced the weight of women's testimony in financial and criminal procedures. Taimur (2010) the legislation only gave women half the weight of a man's testimony, women's rights groups challenged it. They argued that Islamization during Zia's leadership endangered women's rights and the rule of law, and they disagreed with the conservative interpretation of Zia policies. Majlis-i-Shra was founded by General Zia in 1980 in order to change Pakistan's political and constitutional framework in order to implement the Islamization policy. The Islamic Parliament of Pakistan was said to have taken the place of the National Assembly. The Office of the Ombudsman was established to verify that the Federal Government and its numerous agencies, departments, and organizations are unmanaged.

EDUCATIONAL MODERNIZATION

New educational institutions, such as the International Islamic University in Islamabad, the Shar'ah Training Institute, and other ulama training institutions, were founded as a result of educational reforms implemented in the country. Textbooks were revised to incorporate an Islamic approach to education, and the value placed on the Arabic language and Islamic Studies was raised. Islamic Studies, along with Arabic, is now required coursework for all post-baccalaureate degrees in the country, including BA, BS, MBBS, MBA, CE, JD, etc. Hafiz-e-Quran was given a higher grade because of his extensive professional training (Kennedy, 1999). A new revision of the History curriculum "omitted the pre-Islamic period of Indian history" and instead began with the Arab invasion of Sind. Ismaili Jamiat-e-Tulba, the organized student arm of Jamat-e-Islami, gained control of progressive student organizations when he outlawed students' unions at colleges and universities. President Zia, according to Masood Akhtar Zahid, "used education as a foil and as an instrument of state control" (Zahid, 2011).

ISLAMIZATION AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS: ALLIES AND OPPONENTS

There were four main factions that either helped or hindered Zia's Islamization (Nizam-e-Mutafa) in Pakistan. Those groups' goals and interests diverged for various reasons. The first group consisted of General Zia Al-Haq and his political advisors, who played a role in the regime- wide promotion of Islamization initiatives. (Kennedy, 1999) The second group consisted of high- ranking judges and government employees who oversaw the Islamization of the government under General Zia. Although many bureaucrats disapproved of Zia's policies, only a select handful were given responsibility for carrying them out. The political opposition to Zia's Islamization efforts constituted the third faction. Islam-pasand, the fourth faction, were staunch supporters of Zia Nizam- e-Mutafa's policies.

Muslim nationalists pushed for the establishment of Pakistan in order to give Muslims on the subcontinent a place to establish their society in accordance with Islamic law and practice. Pakistan is a country with a Muslim majority, but its political elites have never quite figured out where Islam fits into the country's political system. Pakistani politicians, like the country's military governments, have historically relied on Islamic ideology. For

instance, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a politician known for his extreme secularism, gave his economic reforms the label of "Islamic socialism," and the PPP's platform proclaimed, "Islam is our ideology, socialism our economy, and democracy our politics." Similar to how General Zia Al-Haq legitimized his military regime using Islamic principles. Zia's military dictatorship was given a chance to gain legitimacy as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Zia dictatorship did more than just back the Afghan Mujahideen; they also spread the ideology of Jihad throughout Pakistani society. His goals in starting Pakistan's Islamization project were to strengthen his regime's legitimacy and give him more time in power. According to Charles H. Kennedy, Zia's "Nizam-e- Mustafa can be viewed as a policy designed in part to provide an Islamic justification for the continuation of a military-dominated regime" (Kennedy, 1999)

The global effects of General Zia's Islamization policy are substantial. His government was able to profit from the gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, where millions of Pakistanis are working and from which they transfer money back to their home country. Pakistan also rose to prominence within the Muslim community and the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC). Alongside Pakistan, another important hub of Islamic intellectual activity arose elsewhere in the area and beyond.

General Zia's Islamization initiatives were driven by the Jurists and Bureaucrats. Judges and bureaucrats alike were staunch Zia supporters and resistant to reform. They were well educated in the West, apolitical state employees, and their work was crucial to preserving peace and order. On the other hand, they were "Islamic moderates," or those who held a moderate view of Islam, and therefore they were receptive to Zia's ideas (Kennedy, 1999) There are two political opponents in Pakistan to Zia's Islamization agenda. Zia's policies were criticized on both sides: by secular political opponents who said they went too far, and by Islamists who said they didn't go far enough.

Human rights, misogyny, reaction, undemocratic, anti-minority, and anti-rational arguments were among the many fronts from which secular political opponents attacked President Zia Nizam-e- Mustafa and his Islamization policies. Secular political opponents contended that the stoning to death, lashing, and amputation that were authorized under Zia's odd decree were harsh and barbaric since they violated basic human rights. Islamization, according to the misogynists, violates women's rights. Reactionaries argued that Zia's Islamization of the government was an attempt to return Pakistan to the time of the Caliphs, which would have been 1400 years ago. The dictatorship in Pakistan was propped up by Zia's Nizam-e-Mustafa policies, so the undemocratic argument goes. His policies had led to the suppression of political opponents and the outlawing of political parties.

Since Zia is ruled by the Sunni Hanafi fiqh, the anti-minority stance is also seen as anti-Shia. Non- Muslims, especially Ahmadis and Christians, in the country interpreted it as a kind of discrimination. The anti-rational argument held that Zia's Islamization efforts were obscurantist since they were in opposition to westernization and modernity.

Opponents of General Zia's Islamization programmes typically used a combination of liberal and secular views. For instance, Benazir Bhutto's stance towards odd She criticised the ordinance in the Muslim newspaper on February 12, 1988, calling it "reactionary," "anti-democratic," "anti-female," and "barbaric." She continued, saying, "the Zia-Juno regime is involved in making stoning to death and public hangings a spectator sport" (Kennedy, 1999). The military administration of General Zia in Pakistan strictly censored the country's media outlets, making it impossible for them to publicly oppose his Islamization initiatives. The administration, like the media, chose not to challenge exaggerations. The New York Times and the Guardian, two Western newspapers, published articles that called Zia "fundamentalist Islam" and emphasized the extremism of the movement.

Islamists in Pakistani society were unhappy with Zia's Islamization goals and their implementation. It was reasonable to feel that Zia's policies fell short of the mark. However, these individuals made up only a minor fraction of the administration structures overseeing the Islamization process. The bureaucracy and the courts were both dominated by moderate Muslims, who tended to consider the Islam-pasand as fanatics.

Opponents of Zia's administration on the political front did not enthusiastically embrace the Islamization measures called Nizam-e-Mustafa. Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto fought hard against Zia's Islamization measures. Little was done by the Zia dictatorship to refute these claims; instead, they followed a policy of silence and instructed various institutions to avoid public debates with the opposition on issues related to his Islamization strategy and reforms. This opened the door for Benazir and her PPP party to take advantage of Zia's regressive policies. One of the most prominent concerns of the PPP agenda campaign during the national elections of 1988 was the status of women, which Benazir saw as being threatened by Zia's Islamization programmes.

APPRAISAL

General Zia's primary strategy for legitimizing his power and ensuring his regime's longevity was to promote Islamization. Zia's Islamization campaign found backing from the right-wing Muslim League, and religious parties like Jamat-e-Islami helped legitimize his rule. Zia spent much of his time at home with Sunni ulama and very little time with Shias. The Wahabis in particular viewed Zia as divine and saw in him a modern version of "ulama-friendly mediaeval monarchs." His administration began promoting the creation of a theocratic religious state, as opposed to one based on the principles of modern Islamic democracy (Ahmed, 1994).

Zia assured the people of Pakistan on numerous occasions that the Islamic system was the reason for Pakistan's creation. "There have been military coups before, but now for the first time a maulvi, a deeply religious person was the head of state, the head of government, and the army chief - a frightening combination," said Roedad Khan. Additionally, Khan argued that Zia was "determined to recreate the Islamic legal and social order which had originated in the tribal Arabia more than a thousand years earlier." He had requested a vote on Islam in order to secure his position as leader. In the name of God, he misled the faithful. He often used Islamic slogans to rally the masses to his cause (Ahmed, 2007). General Zia Al- Haq's most repressive military regime, which declared democracy to be alien to the psyche of the Pakistani people, repeatedly chanted the mantra of a poorly defined and distorted concept of Islamic democracy, a veiled Islamic dictatorship, and crushed all attempts at egalitarian change (Zahid, 2011).

CONCLUSION

The political atmosphere in Pakistan was significantly impacted by Zia's politicization of the Islamization process. The Islamic reforms he implemented in Pakistan's legal, constitutional, socioeconomic, and educational institutions were a major political issue during his tenure in office, both under Zia and under the succeeding administrations. His Islamization efforts led to unprecedented levels of repression of students, civil society, and political parties. His Islamization initiatives harmed Pakistan's Shia minority and discriminated against women. The enforcement of clothing regulations and public morals was quite noticeable. Under Zia, public obedience to Islamic moral precepts was rigorously enforced, and modesty in clothing—especially for women—was given more importance.

Those who opposed Zia's Islamization policy denounced the restrictions as reactionary, anti-democratic, and discriminating against women. General Zia also tried to establish Shariah law as the nation's official legal code, but he was unable because of strong popular resistance and a lack of backing from religious organizations. As a powerful and well-liked leader in the Muslim community, Zia saw Pakistan as the "fortress of Islam" of the Islamic world. The Islamization measures of his reign had a profound impact on Pakistan's government and society.

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