

## China's Relations with Central Asia in Twenty-First Century: Strategy Behind Strong Ties

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### **Abstract:**

*This study examines China's involvement in Central Asia in the 21st century. The new tycoon is related to China's foreign policy aspirations in Central Asia, as well as competition between the world's major nations for the management of Central Asian hydrocarbon resources and the ancient Silk Road. This study focuses on the struggle for control while considering geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economics factors. The researcher investigates and explains topics such as oil politics, trade, traditional and non-traditional security, and political hegemony. Our study's primary approach is qualitative, in which the researcher explores China's influence in Central Asia using Mackinder's Heartland theory. Researchers used documentary research to obtain data and selected both primary and secondary records to examine China's involvement in Central Asia. According to the results of this study, China excels in trade, pipeline policies, and attractive economic development. After the Cold War, and after a short period of uniformization, countries like Russia and the United States lag behind in the region. China can win not only the nation but also the hearts of the people, but there are some restrictions due to strategic competition and instability among central Asian states and their domestic issues and issues among them.*

**Keywords:** *China, Central Asia, Energy Resources, Geopolitical Issues, Geo-Economic Issue and Major Powers.*

### **Introduction:**

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are the five countries that makeup Central Asia. They are historically, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally similar (Frappi, 2018), with a few exceptions. As it is one of the most important regions in the world and constitutes the core of the Eurasian continent, it is inseparable from several dynamic and vibrant economies such as China, Russia, Japan, the European Union, and India (Zogg, 2020). It was the crossroads of several strategically important Eurasian regions: China and the Asia-Pacific region to the east, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Middle East to the south, Turkey, Russia, Europe, and the Caucasus to the west. And north (Abdulhamidova, 2009, p.10). In 1843, German philosopher Alexander von Humboldt recognized Central Asia as an important region of the world for the first time (Rogers, 2020). The significance of Central Asia's five states' strategic location, as well as other players such as Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Europe, which are connecting with the region for their national interests.

Global politics has shifted dramatically and is presumably heading toward multipolarity. The primary participants in the international system are changing (Cokins, 2017). There is also economic competition, an arms race, and a balance of power to achieve geopolitical, geopolitical, and geopolitical goals (Wigell et al., 2018). This power struggle can be seen from north to south. This changing situation is essential to determine where China stands in the country and its ability to take advantage of international politics (Friedberg, 2005).

Schwimmer and Pu (2011) make an important reflection on China's role in the developing international system. They want to know what role China can play. Can you go up? According to them, it is now an established reality that China is playing an active role in the world to boost its economic power. Meanwhile, towards the end of the 20th century, his political rise was seen. Scholars are currently discussing whether China can change the world's power relations (Niquet, 2008). The geographical, energetic, economic, political and security implications of China's involvement in Central Asia are well known. This is the basic tool underlying China's strategy for the major republics of Central Asia stated by Vakuchuk & Overland (2019). China and Central Asia are geographically intertwined. Meanwhile, China is building energy corridors throughout the region to improve cooperation. The progress of China's industrialization shows economic benefits to Central Asia. It also utilizes the region's natural resources (Bukhari, 2012, Wei et al., 2019). Strategically, the Central African Republic and China share a common goal of combating terrorism, radicalism, and separatism in the region (Zhuangzhi, 2007). A prominent geopolitical actor in Central Asia for over 20 years, China is now focusing on energy diplomacy. China was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Central African countries (Pradhan, 2020). China's commitment to energy (oil and gas) in CAR is growing day by day, and changes in investment, energy trading, trade, and pipeline networks are drawing the attention of international stakeholders (Liao, 2019). .. China first showed interest in the energy sector in Central Asia in the mid-1990s, and this interest is rapidly spreading to other sectors of the economy (Macaes, 2019).

China pays close attention to oil and gas (energy) complexes in other regions to promote economic and political interests in each state of the region (Paramonov & Stokov, 2010, p.18). ..China must use all of its clouts to seize control of these hydrocarbon deposits in order to meet the energy needs of its expanding industrial might in the twenty-first century. Similar to that, this also demonstrates China's previous involvement in the area. But in contemporary circumstances, the market plays a bigger part than the past does. Additionally, it satisfies China's ambition for a regional balance of power (Xu, 1999, p.52).

China's interaction with CARs is active (Imomnazar, 2018, p. 32-34). The strength of the CARs' hydrocarbon resources, their economic capacity, and their significance as transfer state all influence the extent of energy and economic cooperation between China and the CARs. Additionally, important factors include each CAR's domestic stability as well as its collaboration with China's strategy and ideas (Dong et al., 2019). The ambition to develop western portions of the Chinese mainland as a political objective was another aspect of China's interaction with Central Asia. As China's western region was less developed and less wealthy. These areas, in particular Xinjiang, are linked to Central Asia (Dave & Kobayashi, 2018).

As a result, Central Asia receives around one-third of all trade from China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, removing extremism and terrorism for socio-political and economic stability is the actual issue for China, in addition to CARs in the region (Pradt, 2020; Leibold, 2020). According to Sarwat (2020), China is handling terrorism-related issues on a bilateral and SCO forum. The three CARs of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are also dependent on China for security, according to Boute (2019), as they all share a border with China.

It is important to note that neither China nor the smaller CARs aspire to exercise hegemony over the region. Rather, commercial concerns are its only agenda (Loke, 2019). Furthermore, China is treating every situation diplomatically and via its business firms rather than through the military or security services. This benefits smaller CARs, which allows China to focus on harvesting resources that benefit the entire region (Imomnazar, 2018, pp. 29-32; Garlick & Havlova, 2020). Still, there are issues like ethnic conflicts in the Xinjiang

Uygur Autonomous Region, and powerful nations like the United States are taking advantage of China's destabilization of the region. Moreover, despite signing a friendship agreement with Russia, it still faces instability due to China's economic development (Zhuangzhi, 2007).

**Literature Review:**

The researcher has looked into a number of studies that relate to China's involvement in Central Asia. The literature focuses a lot on China's regional economic, energy, political, and security concerns. Obtaining energy supplies from the area is crucial since it gives China's burgeoning industrial sector a lifeline.

In his article, *China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times*, Ramakant Dwivedi (2006) outlines the primary economic and border security issues that China has as they relate to international relations. When the USSR broke up, Dwivedi notes that conflicts over independence were sought by the Uyghurs, a cultural group living in China's Xinjiang province and in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, brought attention to China's interests in the region. Dwivedi not only focuses on these minor security issues but also on China's post-Soviet goals for control of the local economy and access to oil. These goals are reflected in the actions of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has many agreements with countries such as Uzbekistan. In most cases, these agreements facilitate the exploration and construction of roads that enable the growth of infrastructure and the development of oil production.

*The Relationship between China and Central Asia*, published by Zhuangzhi in 2007, asserts that it is founded on economic, political, geographic, and security considerations. The main justification for China's strategy toward Central Asia is this. Both states are neighbors and have the same opinions on many regional and global problems. China and the Central Asian governments are working together economically to build pipeline networks and trade. Regarding security issues, both parties share a desire to see extremism, terrorism, and separatism eradicated from the area. Hurst (2007) asserts that China's goal is in obtaining oil from many nations across the world in his report, *China's Global Quest for Energy*. Furthermore, China's reliance on foreign oil and gas sources will increase over time. China has joined the contest since millions of enterprises worldwide rely on independent oil factories and a huge number of consumers buy autos. China has created a multifaceted, geo-economic, and geostrategic vision for its global quest for oil in an effort to win this oil competition.

In their book, *Oil Actual: Chinese and U.S. Energy Security Policy in the Caspian Sea Region*, Kelly, and Leland (2007) states that the Caspian Sea is an important resource in China's energy security quest, as China is currently a major oil importer. Pointing out the recent emergence and examining China's interests and policies in the region. China's 1990 oil-rich Azerbaijan independence provided China with valuable resources for industrial development. China first showed an interest in the Caspian Basin in the early decades. Today, by securing a balanced and favourable position in the major oil and gas trade, China is at a major stage in the region's energy policy. Entered. China is Kazakhstan's major oil supplier. Schichor (2008) reassessed long-standing strategic goals and diplomatic policies in Central Asia and reassessed China's relationship with CAR in its Central Asian strategy and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Considered China's swift decision to re-establish relations. The border was opened in line with China's desire to prioritize economic growth at the expense of the instability of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. SCO was officially established by China to combat terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. China has made informal efforts to gain political influence, security, economic benefits, and access to energy resources. After the fact, China's performance is at best slightly positive.

*The World of Oil and Gas in Central Asia: Power Politics, Market Power, and Stealth Pipeline* by Fredholm (2008) explore the idea that market power is actually keeping Central

Asia away from trade. Gazprom, the sole exporter of natural gas from Russia, is taking the lead in adjusting to market pressures in Central Asia. The importance of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in terms of importing and exporting hydrocarbon resources for the economies of Central Asia and the rest of the globe is compared and examined. The energy footprint of Central Asia and its market were explored in China's Energy Security Approach in Central Asia by Koolae and Tishehyar (2009). The geopolitical location of Central Asia makes China's energy strategy valuable. The CARs and China can share similar perspectives on terrorism, vulnerabilities, and violent Muslim movements because of their proximity to one another geographically. China backs the autocratic governments in Central Asia. China engages mostly in the region's economic sector and offers financial assistance to its member states. All of the authoritarian nations in Central Asia with reliable energy sources. In order to keep political commitments, collaboration with Russia and China is favoured. The SCO provides China with a powerful diplomatic platform with the CARs as well as a useful tool for advancing China's interests and Central Asian alignment. Although competition between Russia, China, and the USA appears to be escalating quickly in the region and may provide some challenges, China will continue to be a strong power in the years to come. The energy basin in this region is not China's main goal. Instead, by using this Trump as a tool to achieve geopolitical and strategic goals, we maintain a valuable and connected position among other competitors in the region.

In his article, *China's Strategic Involvement in Central Asia: Results and Obstacles*, Berkofsky (2012), China and Central Asian authorities, through effective efforts, China inherited Russia and this region. It shows that we are confident that we will be the most powerful actors. At the same time maintain stability. China is the region's largest economic partner, and its significant investment promotes cooperative partnerships rather than political hegemony in the region. China supports the region's anti-democratic position and avoids its brutal political tactics. Russia, on the other hand, believes that China is an unwelcome guest, hampering its ability to exert geopolitical influence. Therefore, Russia opposes China's military action in Central Asia and recognizes China's growing political, economic, and military influence. *China's Role and Interest in Central Asia* by Mariani (2013) examine China's security and economic interests in the region of Xinjiang. China has serious concerns about it. In the context of the New Great Game in regions where the interests of Russia, Europe, and the United States clash, it is expanding economically in Central Asia. The dynamism and strength of China's economy allow both China and Central Asia to benefit from mutually favourable situations.

The fundamental historical and geopolitical dimensions of Central Asia are highlighted in *Central Asia: The Bends of History and Geography* by Duarte (2014). The grandeur and glory of Central Asia in terms of the geostrategic and global economy are illuminated by a variety of geopolitical factors. Mackinder emphasizes the geostrategic importance of the Eurasian region in his Heartland theory. It is asserted that the region has evolved into a battlefield between the main powers as a result of its geostrategic significance, wealth in oil and gas deposits, and connections to the West and East. As reported in *China-Central Asia relations: Socio-economic and security analysis of bilateral relations* by Khalid et al. (2016) China is a global economic power that aims to expand its industrial sector and potentially lucrative markets and collect resources to maintain its position as a dominant seller.

In a study entitled "Gas Outlook for Central Asia in the 2020s," Pilani (2019) found oil and gas production, imports, exports, pipelines in Central African countries, and China from 2010 to 2010. Discusses how to establish an energy link with these countries during 2020. The study explores possible outcomes and changes in China's energy interests in Central Asia. It focuses on the important role China plays in building energy connections

with the region. China and the New Eurasian Agenda: From Extraordinary Interests to Strategic Cooperation, Ferguson (2019) said that along the southern, northern, and western borders of China, China had relationships with people from many different ethnic groups. Insist. China has long maintained economic ties to make a significant impact on Central Asia. Today, with the development of the new Silk Road, China has an established relationship in the fields of oil, politics, and culture. China and Russia have formed a strategic alliance to create a multipolar world.

China's Strategy towards Central Asia: Interests, Principles, and Policy Instruments, Feng (2019) examines how China and five Central Asian governments formed strategic cooperation for trust and mutual benefit almost 30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. China and the New Eurasian Agenda: From Special Interests to Strategic Cooperation, Ferguson (2019) stated that China had relationships with people from many different ethnic groups along the southern, northern, and western borders of China. Said that it was maintained. Throbbing. China has long maintained economic ties to have a major impact on Central Asia. Today, with the development of the new Silk Road, China has established relationships in the fields of oil, politics, and culture. China and Russia have a strategic alliance to build a multipolar world. For the sake of regional peace and development, China adheres to the ideals of peaceful coexistence and non-threatening policies toward this region. The interests, methods, and strategies of China as well as the region's future course are the main topics of this study.

China-Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A new regionalism, visualization, and geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia, Clark (2010) examine the importance of SCO and China's leadership in SCO. These are essential for building partnerships with neighbouring countries. Gain access to secure oil and gas resources. But China's position in Xinjiang and Central Asia is clearly linked to its capacity to gradually pursue a program of peaceful growth. According to Clarke, China has been successful in gaining political and economic sway in Central Asia through bilateral and multilateral relationships in order to resolve the regions unresolved border disputes, forge security and military alliances, and restrain secessionist activities.

#### **The identified gap in the literature:**

The gaps in the prior studies have been carefully identified through a comprehensive discussion of the existing literature, and deliberate efforts have been taken to close the gaps in this study. Central Asia's geopolitical and geo-economics elements are coming together. The new world economic system is emerging amid these shifting patterns of international politics. Globalization, regional integration, commerce in energy (oil and gas), and international trade transportation are some of the key contributors to this change in power. This study focuses on China's energy connections with Central Asia, an area that is extremely valuable in terms of geopolitical, geo-economics, and geostrategic dimensions as well as in terms of the "Heartland" theory. The study also discusses the SCO's role in making China the dominant force in Central Asia, a topic that has largely been overlooked when discussing the region's energy politics. On the other hand, the researcher looks into the geopolitical, geo-economics, and geostrategic significance of the SCO in the larger Eurasian region. The researcher also makes an effort to identify China's grand strategy for the future in this area and investigates whether it will focus simply on trade or also have military components.

#### **Significance of the Study:**

This study's importance is broad. China has received more attention as a result of the region's importance from a geostrategic, geopolitical, and geo-economics standpoint. The term "China's Engagement" has been used by the researcher to describe two aspects, namely its integration/engagement in the energy (oil and gas) sector and a brief description of the security aspects it provides, which are interconnected in terms of the security stability of the

Xinjiang province and will have a positive impact on China's energy trade. According to the researcher, China's energy nexus will be strengthened, which will strengthen its economy and make it look like the region's burgeoning energy superpower with an enormous power position. China is a significant trader, partner, and investor in Central Asia. Why has China accelerated its contact with central Asia in the twenty-first century is the question. Between the years 2001, when China first entered Central Asia, and 2022, the researcher describes this phenomenon. In the meantime, China is expanding, modernising, and taking a proactive role in the region. China demonstrated its energy interest in the area to boost its economy by concluding an increasing number of energy deals and making significant investments. The idea of the "Beginning of a New Great Game" is demonstrated by China's entry into the region and its establishment of progressive cooperative energy relations with the states of the region. This report explains how China wants to increase profits with the region with abundant natural resources by integrating its economy. China is taken into account by the researcher as a linking land and marine route. However, ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, which causes instability in the region, places restrictions on China. As a result, the researcher also examines China's goals and policy actions while emphasising the importance of this region for China. This study helps students, researchers, academics, and analysts learn in-depth details regarding China's regional integration.

**Research Objectives:**

- To discuss China's regional interests in the twenty-first century.
- To examine the 21st-century energy ties between China and Central Asia.
- To investigate China's interactions with the US and Russia in the area.

**Research Questions:**

1. Why is Central Asia regarded as a significant territory for China?
2. What are China's latest initiatives for fostering closer ties with the states in the region?
3. If there are other players in the region, will China establish itself as the dominant force?
4. What are China's main difficulties in Central Asia?

**Research Methodology:**

The researcher prefers a qualitative technique over a quantitative one because of the study questions and the nature of the inquiry. Quantitative methods, unlike other social sciences studied by society, the community, or numerous laboratories, explore and generalize hypotheses by presenting measurable numbers of data through sample questions. Will be a viable tool. But in order to examine and notice causation in the study of interstate relations, an in-depth investigation is needed. This can be accomplished most effectively in a qualitative environment and by looking at documentary data. Creating a scale to evaluate China's experiences, preferences, decisions, and policies in the five Central Asian states is challenging. During the time of my research, the researcher mostly relied on documents while choosing data. There are no interviews, focus groups, or field-based research components in this study. The researcher mainly used primary and secondary sources of data in documentary form. The writers and organizations directly involved in the phenomena (Lamont, 2015) of Chinese engagement in the CARs treat the original documents as official reports and works. In the meanwhile, secondary documents include published books, journal articles that are accessible online and in Pakistani libraries, newspaper pieces, and reports that are primarily accessible online. Online sources included reports from research think tanks and international organizations.

**Limitations of the Research:**

Despite the breadth of the subject, this study is limited to China's energy-related activities in Central Asia. China's involvement, trade, and investment in the five countries of the region in the energy sector form the basis of this study. Due to limited access and available resources, direct interviews with Chinese government officials, diplomats and businesses that have

made significant investments in the region were not possible. Due to similar restrictions, the researcher was also unable to undertake fieldwork in the CARs. As a result, documentary research is the focus of this work. The researcher has made an effort to include the most recent facts and significant data in this study through documents, keeping in mind the energy interactions between China and Central Asia in the twenty-first century.

### **Theoretical Framework:**

#### **Mackinder's Heartland Theory:**

Halford Mackinder put out this notion in 1904. (Sawe, 2017, p.1). The high seas, Central Asia, and Eurasia were all terms used to describe the Heartland. The center of Eurasia, which encompasses all of Europe and Asia, is referred to as the heartland. This theory is based on the idea of what would happen if major international powers engaged in war on land and at sea (Bassin & Aksenoy, 2006). Countries with sizable navies had an advantage over those unable to gradually sail the oceans. The ability to control territory and provide defense capabilities has been significantly changed by aircraft use in the industrial age (Rosenberg, 2018, p. 1).

#### **Application of Mackinder's Heartland Theory:**

The foundation of this study is Mackinder's Heartland theory, which is the theory that most accurately describes the situation in Central Asia. It has been well known for a while that the Central Asian crisis and Mackinder's Heartland theory have had a significant impact on global politics. The researcher examined the Heartland idea and evaluated the nations' present land and maritime power. The researcher also evaluates China's involvement in Central Asia, which has drawn attention and caused significant problems for the adoption of policies and strategies to address various areas of global politics. In order to achieve geopolitical and geoeconomics benefits through land and sea areas, the researcher addressed the overview of Heartland theory by emphasis for many examples in global politics.

Major states pay priority to Central Asia because of its effective geopolitical, geoeconomics, and geostrategic importance. A role in this region has been sought by developed nations including the US, China, Russia, and others. This study's theoretical framework, which is based on the Heartland hypothesis, looks at land and road transportation as a major driver of economic growth in the oil and gas industries. China has been working to invest in energy economics, and commerce, and improve relations with CARs for better and longer durations.

Mackinder's Heartland theory, which previously emphasized Russia's hegemony in Central Asia, now sees China as an Asian force influencing Central Asia. By making Central Asia the reopened core of the larger Eurasian region and strengthening and strengthening its strategic international relevance, China's new Great Game through BRI could surpass the previous Great Game (Chen & Fazilov, 2018, p.2). (Harper et al., 2017, p.16).

### **Three Geopolitical Essentials for China:**

#### **i. Maintaining Interior Unity:**

The main geopolitical obligation is to maintain internal cohesion within the Han-China region. China's great danger comes from the domestic division created by financial development in the heart of Han China after the Chinese economy began around the world in 1978. The centre of China has emerged from many sides. One is a prosperous coastal area, and the other is a fragile and poverty-stricken inner region in central China, but it is no longer a buffer zone in China. Key geopolitical issues for maintaining internal cohesion can be diagnosed using this scenario. To improve China, we must participate in world exchange. If you need it, you need to use Beach town as a way to connect to the world. When that happens, the coastal towns and their surroundings seem to prosper more and more. After that, alien domination in this environment escalated, and the connection between alien entertainment and the Chinese coast began to compete with the entertainment of valuable

authorities. When the powerful force weakens, the surrounding area can become out of control and China can be threatened by foreign agents. In the old sense, land substitution is no longer a problem for China. The Silk Road embraced foreign control to advance into China, and the increase in prosperity brought about a period of overall controllable but volatile. The variability of industrialization has changed both the geography of China and its consequences. In the mid-19th century, a new episode appeared in Chinese records when Europe, centered on Britain, asked Chinese authorities to offer to buy and sell to Britain. For the first time, Pacific beaches have become a link to Earth, which is no longer close to Central Asia.

China participates in development within the technology of globalization but needs to interact with the changes in the world, especially seen in sea lanes. And that is China's weakness. The functioning of Central Asia seemed to be decisive in determining this issue. If the transition to peace is a key factor in causing imbalances around China, strengthening people living in the Han-China region by creating new alternatives to Central Asia through the West, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It may also help you to develop the beach area and give you the opportunity to provide political balance. This will help strengthen your valuable regime. The restored order of the Great Silk Directorate can be very important. This will merge the western district with the center of China. This monetary integration should be influential support for modifying improvements in these areas and balancing the image of separatists. China has made important attempts along this path,

**ii. Maintaining Hold of the Buffer Regions:**

The second geopolitical importance is to convince the buffer space. According to the 1949 Chinese Muse, China was given sovereign sanctuaries in its outermost regions, especially Xinjiang, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. China's Chief Mao has improved the locational security of Han China by integrating the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet's buffer zones. Retaining Tibet confirmed that all Indian elements could affect the entire Himalayas and create a safe base for operations on the Tibetan Plateau. Manchuria and Inner Mongolia buffered China from the Russian side, and Xinjiang created a buffer from the Central Asian side. Remote areas, vulnerable transport, and fewer sources are that seizures can run into major rational problems before they reach the human land of Han China and appear to be blocked. Buffer Place describes a vast and safe area that is very difficult to cross to reach mainland China. These buffer zones were considered the reason for China's national security. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has proven to be extremely important to China's national security, and the separatist ideas of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region are not always permitted by China. It is important to maintain the political and financial balance of Central Asia and protect this place from competitiveness.

**iii. Securing the Seaside from External Invasion:**

The geopolitical key of 0.33 for China is to stabilize the coastal side. Today, no energy has the hobby or power to occupy mainland China and prefers to win. Therefore, an intrusion is not always a legitimate threat. Deng Xiaoping wants to expand China's economic system to the outside world in 1978, and China still wants to maintain an effective and decisive government. A weakening of central energy can diverge the buffer zone of Han and China, making it difficult to protect mainland China. Therefore, financial issues are as essential as the Navy to stabilize China's territorial integrity. It is also very important for China to see China's geopolitical protection from this perspective in the face of today's international financial globalization, where financial factors are very important. In today's situation, China is essentially dependent on the altitude of the Navy, and the wonderful way of life of the US Navy in the Pacific could barricade them. This can become even more difficult if we can be surrounded by the Central Asian side with the help of the United States. Therefore, China has a simple hobby of withdrawing US troops from Central Asia. Equally important is to activate



the routes of change through Central Asia and increase the likelihood of change during the conflict.

### **China's Strategy towards Central Asia; Four Key Factors:**

#### **I. Securing Domestic Stability and Safeguarding National Integration:**

China has found that the resilience of Central Asia is closely linked to the internal protection of western China. During the post-Cold War era, Central Asia emerged in China as an uncertain region radiating Turkish nationalism and Islamic thought to the West River (Lund, 2019). The risks to China can be very obvious within the Uighur ethnic community. The Uighur diaspora can reach 11 million, of which nearly 10 million live in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Gallagher, 2019). Between 300,000 and 1,000,000, many live in five stages of Central Asia (Scobell et al., 2014, p. 9). Given the protests and atrocities of Uighur militants in the 1990s, ethnic terrorism has emerged as a major challenge for China. This area is one-sixth of the total land area of China (p.10). This susceptibility has several signs and symptoms, including B. Well-prepared complaints about terrorism, radicalism, and separatism in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, regular closure of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region's net community, and restrictions on overseas access to regions across the country (Wright, 2019). China's attempts to improve security within the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region require attention to the emergence of triples, maintenance of social order, fiscal improvement attempts, and national integration (Bunker, 2019).

#### **II. Sustaining Social Order:**

That is very important. Dissatisfied Uighurs are particularly threatening China because of the identified link between internal problems and external threats (Ali, 2020). Chinese officers and leaders are ready to get rid of terrorism, extremism and separatism (Allison, 2018). In their view, all three flow together and are titled "Three Evil" in a row (Li, 2018). Discovered in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 2002, their intention is ethnic separatism, non-secular extremism is their clothes, and terrorist movements are their tools (Gunawana et al., 2020). In the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, terrorist attacks have occasionally occurred in the last few decades, and during the decade 1999-2009, there was a great deal of drowsiness in organized protests (Cappelletti, 2020). External experts attributed the decades of anti-Kingdom activity and decades of atrocities in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to an aggressive and effective crackdown by China's threat tools (Fromm, 2019). Therefore, the review did not explain the main injustice of the Uighur group. Urumqi's inhumanity in 2009 emphasized that Uighur injustices are deep and vast, and ruthless repression no longer scares Uighurs from the Kingdom of China (Yeoh, 2019). Martin Wayne said: "Many discussions today emphasize whether China will respond quickly to the threat of terrorism. Analysts say there were far fewer incidents in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region between 1990 and 2009 than in other states. Uighur riots and terrorism continue to be a major concern for the Chinese government, but not the major civil war China is experiencing (Robert, 2020). As of 2009, the density of ethnic instability in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is increasing (Dalgaard et al., 2020). At least three dozen people were killed in Hotan and Kashgar in 2011, according to Chinese government documents (Liu & Yuan, 2019). In 2009, 197 people were killed in a major anti-Chinese brawl in Urumqi. The Chinese government is solving modern steps through bomb explosions, immortal police pursuits, random identification, and concrete hunting (Merali, 2017). In 2011, China also dispatched the People's Armed Police (PAP) Snow Leopard Anti-Terrorist Unit, which was tasked with providing security for the 2008 China Olympics, to host the annual China-Eurasia Expo in Urumqi. I supported you. Combat is taking place inside and outside the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Jacobs, 2016). In 2013, an incident occurred in a village heading to Kashgar (Steenerg & Rippa, 2019). Chinese media reported that police officers and 14 civilians were killed. Given the ethnic instability and riots that occurred in 1997 and 2009,

especially the resulting harsh activity, it is not surprising that the situation in China has been noticed with great concern (Diabate, 2020). China has forced America to recognize ETIM as a terrorist organization. In a delayed 2002 government regulation, authorities designated ETIM as a terrorist agency (Roberts, 2018). There is a whereabouts for security force representatives to maintain the challenges of social order within China (Bastid, 2017).

Forefront is deployed and operated by China's organized police department, the Department of Public Safety (MPS), with PAP acting as the first support. PAP is fundamentally important in dealing with protests and riots, with an estimated 100,000 paramilitary organizations in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Wheelehan, 2019). If the MPS and PAP cannot handle the situation, a PLA will be dispatched to end the turmoil. It served as an important encouragement in halting the turmoil in Tibet in 2008 and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 2009. China's PLA is fraudulent with respect to important protection obligations in competition abroad and domestic security (Verma, 2019). The PLA, like all branches of the subordinate Navy, is believed to be primarily focused on external protection, but important, such as closing some protection in the event of major domestic turmoil. It also has internal responsibility (Senturk, 2019).

### **III. Economic Growth:**

China recognizes that Uighur dissatisfaction is particularly the result of poverty and financial collapse (Jenkins, 2018). The answer to that financial development (Prokhorova et al., 2016). The goal of the "Cross West" strategy, which appeared in 2000, has changed to the creation of western China (Notteboom & Yang, 2017). In Western language, China's government is China's largest landlocked country, except that it is much larger than the simplest Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Lanzhou MR. There are six provinces in this sector, including Shaanxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Qinghai, and Gansu. Five self-sufficient areas (Yin, 2020) include Tibet, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, and Chongqing City. Since this population is not a minority, the entire site covered more than half of China's entire population and almost a zone of China's population. China has made aggressive attempts to upgrade its western China infrastructure for over a decade (Bianchi, 2019). Economic growth has been a major driver of national financing in macro phase engineering programs, including those designed to design infrastructure such as roads, dams, and railroads (Chin & Gallagher, 2019). Improving national integration, on the one hand, provides a country-like atmosphere, making ethnic minorities feel part of a multi-ethnic lineage, and as a result, Han Chinese to western China. We have sought to support migration and achieve a stable democracy in Xinjiang. The mercy of a related ethnic group in China (Yang, 2018). Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has high financial costs and great financial potential so far for China (Garlick, 2018). The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has large reserves of oil, coal and plant fuel, all of which are essential power resources for China that must be utilized (Caineng et al., 2019).

In 2009, the site had about 30% of the country's oil reserves, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was converted to the oil production category by one-third (Scobell et al., 2014, p. 15; Cao et al., 2018). At this location, there are about 34 national vegetable fuels labelled in the manufacture of this power source (Mazhar et al., 2018). Coal operations in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region are developing rapidly, but the site accounts for 40% of the country's total coal reserves (Wingo, 2020). In addition, Xinjinag can ventilate a great deal of wind and solar power (Tong et al., 2020). In addition to its abundant strength reserves, the site has significant assets of non-ferrous metals such as copper and nickel (Gurieva & Ilina, 2020). Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is a magnificent and fertile place, functioning as China's largest producer of bright trade-grade cotton. A large amount of wool grows in this place where a large number of people gather.

### **IV. National Integration:**

China's indoctrination aims to draw attention to China's united multi-ethnic position (Tobin, 2020). The border of China coincides with the border of the Qing dynasty, and China in the 25th century continues to expand (O'Brien, 2020). Although China's population is very Han, almost 9% of China's inhabitants belong to 50 officially diagnosed ethnic minorities, consisting of Tibetans, Mongolians, and Uighurs (Dabringhaus), 2018). Many of these minorities operate in strategic border areas (Si, 2017). The groups defined above have regions that do not depend on the popularity of the state and give these minorities significant autonomy (Gunes & Baylr, 2020). In terms of implementation, their autonomy is the most effective in the idea, but in reality, these rulers are under Chinese control (Shiu-Hing, 2016). For 16 years, the party secretary of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region changed to Wang Lequan, a Han Chinese (1994-2010). He moved to his waist with the help of all the other Han, Zhang Chunxian (Tyson & Wu, 2016). The head of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has been Uighur Nurbekuri since 2007 (Caprioni, 2012). Uighur companies carefully view terrorism as a major factor in countering hostility and intensifying attempts (Clarke, 2011). Attempts to unify ethnic minorities have had completely limited results, especially when Uighurs and Tibetans are struggling (Grose, 2019). In contrast, in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Tibet, it is easy to observe the increasing number of Han Chinese residents and migrants, especially in urban areas, but attempts to transport Han Chinese settlers to the west are far more common. Has been successful (Cliff, 2016). .. The influx of Chinese is increasing excitement as locals generally tend to think they are busy, and the benefits of the financial boom have not been brought to Han (Jomo & Sundaram, 2004). In the 20th century, the Han Chinese regulations turned out to be people of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). XPCC evolved from the Kuomintang (KMT Nationalist Party) and PLA forces stationed in western China (Tynen, 2019). XPCC also hired different Han Chinese settlers at different levels, including the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s (Roberts, 2020).

The unique form, which is now the least effective, has brought about not only the national integration of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, but also the continuous financial improvement and protection of the region (Anand, 2019). XPCC has 2.5 million Han Chinese employees, with more than 900,000 employees painting Xinjiang factories, mines and farms at the macro level. They are said to be prepared with up to 170 prepared farms and 14 departments of military ropes with huge construction, shops, and business activities (Goertz & Streitparth, 2019). These 100,000 are organized directly into the army group (Scobell et al., 2014, p.17). The task of XPCC is to dig up and shield the boundary area assigned to XPCC.

Significant investment by the administration seems to be accelerating the invasion of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. In 2011, more than 8 million Han Chinese settled in the autonomous region (Wu et al., 2019). Reliable numbers of underestimate Han Chinese residents as they are no longer both migrant workers working in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and employees of various military or paramilitary organizations (PLA and PAP) (Millward) working in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. There is likely to be. Petersson, 2020). As a result, conflicts arose among Uighur citizens and there was no significant progress in the employment or housing requirements of various Uighurs (Li, 2020). Great confirmation is that the financial boom within Beyond 3 has long weighed on even the escalating state of ethnic insecurity and mental illness within the rules (Scobell et al., 2014, pp. 9-17; Rothchild & Chazan, 2019. ).

### **Efforts of China To Maintain Peace On Its border With Central Asia.**

Peace on the border with China is considered important for domestic stability (Meng, 2020). This basically presupposes Chinese dominance in these areas and limited authority from outside forces (Liu & Song, 2020). Since 1991, China has appeared to have stabilized a

brand-new state along the border (Shambaugh, 2020). Internally, strengthening the CCP's energy supply was fundamental, and at the external stage, highlighting the specific barriers of its vast borders near the north and west became a major concern. China has worked hard to expand its family in CAR and Mongolia (Yazdani, 2020). By the mid-1990s, these attempts were considered fruitful, and the willpower and confidence-building measures of the territorial dispute eventually became a demilitarized zone (Labarre & Niculescu, 2020). China also sought to respond to threats from ethnic minorities within China who were dissatisfied with cross-border crackdowns, economic growth, and cooperation with Central Asian partners (Hesham, 2020). CAR has a weak, corrupt, dictatorial, and secular government (Rotberg, 2020). Major local ethnic groups include Tajiks and Afghanistan (which may be related to Persians / Iranians), Turkmens, Kazakhs, Uzbeks (this is the Turkish population), and important Include Russian citizens. China hastily built a comfortable relationship and reported non-interference with CAR (Bas, 2020). There was green diplomacy aimed at continuing China's visits to these capitals at a larger stage (Ciravegna et al., 2020). China has resolved the border issue with post-Soviet countries, but this has taken a considerable amount of time and extensive attempts have been made to achieve it (Schwartz, 2020). It took time to complete the China-China border issue with the three Central Asian agents (Pan & Gong, 2020). In 1994, China and Kazakhstan signed a comprehensive agreement, which was finally signed in 2002 (Contessi, 2019). In 1996 and 1999, the border with Kyrgyzstan was categorized by the agreement and border markings initiated in 2001, and the border settlement was completed in 2004. A border to be shared with Tajikistan was decided in 2002, but the actual nature of the border did not begin until 2006, and the road was not formally sealed until the Tajikistan Parliament signed the treaty in 2011 (Scobell). et al., 2014, pp. 18-19).

#### **China and Balance of Power with Other Major Powers in the Region:**

China aims to balance its current popularity in Central Asia by expanding its dominance, shrinking some of the great powers, scrutinizing terrorism, and increasing the number of financial families (Xuetong, 2019). Geographically Central Asian neighborhoods (Mishra, 2020) surround three major powers, including Russia near the north and west, China in the east, and Iran in the southwest. Some other great powers are far away, but they still have influence and hobbies, such as the United States, Turkey, and India. Some small countries, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, have additional entertainment and authority in Central Asia (Islam, 2020). All these external forces, especially Russia and the United States, have been involved at various levels using financial, diplomatic, and naval means to exert influence (Sim & Fulton, 2020).

#### **Russia:**

In historical terms, Russia has become a major neighboring country and all states of Central Asia have become the former Soviet Republic (Yalcinkaya & Hatipoglu, 2020). Central Asia remains a fascinating Russian sphere of influence and an important place for Russia to be "close to abroad" (Chankseliani, 2020). One of the Chinese experts in Central Asia said the environment was very Russified. Such a degree was emphasized by the presence of Russian infantry and Russian nomads. As a result, they are part of a solid economic family and have a relationship with Russia (Tatsumi and Tsurumi, 2020). In addition to financial and naval influences, Russian influences in Central Asia are also composed of ethnic and linguistic elements. Approximately 10 million Russians call CAR their hometown and provide information about the local communiqué or dialect being Russian (Balci, 2018). Most of these Russians live in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Wilson, 2016). However, unlike China, Russia now has several naval forces near Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, operated by about 1,000 Marines. On an ongoing basis, Russia is trying to bring in important strategic hobbies in Central Asia (Vani, 2020). Russia has established the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO). Until 2002, this included trafficking and terrorism in Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia is also a member of SCO (McDermott, 2020). China is not necessarily a CSTO member, but China maintains an accurate relationship with Russia (Scepanovic, 2020). Ready negotiations took place between Russian and Chinese officers, with all financial, security, and diplomatic cooperation under the auspices of the SCO. China sees Russia as a challenger in Central Asia, but Chinese officers see war and mutual avoidance of painting as mutually beneficial (Pop & Grigoras, 2020). Russia will continue to weaken, as many Chinese experts consider Russia a weak strength (Hayat & Khalil, 2020). Russia is working on several approaches as a beneficial partner for China (Zhumagulov & Sadykova, 2020). For example, Russia and China, respectively, do not have the unusual hobby of dealing with US domination in Central Asia and everywhere (Dadabaev, 2020).

### **The United States of America:**

Not only does it have delicate strength, but it also has great military, financial and diplomatic skills (Weissmann, 2020). Soft strength is when deployed by governments in the capitals of China, Russia, and Central Asia, as the United States defends democracy and human rights, constantly provides support, and expands relations depending on the authorities dealing with human rights. Usually considered a true precaution (Porter, 2020). Dictators are significantly unaffected by the use of such forces and, in the worst case, understand the threat of their use (Kaire De Francisco, 2020). A significant event was the recognition that the Uzbek chief was deployed to close the US military base in Qarshi Kanobod, leading to US grief over the brutal defeat of the 2005 domestic rebellion. However, in addition to its strategic position, Central Asian states have established experts to support truly valuable intrinsic value in the global fight against US-led terrorism in the form of economic gain (Zhao, 2020).

China's predominant anxiety issues the American army lifestyles in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Due to starting of Operation Enduring Freedom leaders get the concept that America is seeking to surround China (Ford, 2020). Many Chinese are of the view that the American goal of preserving enduring bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan. China is doubtful of American declarations that US army troops will be put off from the location following the operation in Afghanistan (Easley, 2020). Most Chinese professionals universal the essential geostrategic reasons for Americans to keep critical army lifestyles following the realization of Operation Enduring Freedom (Diamond & Schell, 2019). This view is very logical, as the United States sees Central Asia as a strategically important region that has wanted to sacrifice much blood and wealth to the United States since 2001 (Raghavan, 2018). China's primary concern is the US Air Force, with experts citing special interest in the US Air Force in areas such as Manas in Kyrgyzstan and Bagram in Afghanistan. China is happy to observe that the United States organized a mana abolition in 2014 (Levin et al., 2016). Historically, the US military's greatest fear of China's use was air power (French, 2017).

However, PLA will be an excellent air defense system "Woodward, 2017". The PLA Air Force continues to pay close attention to the construction of air-raid operations. In the 21st century, China is particularly concerned about US air sovereignty (Dower, 2017). This context has changed significantly to protect the political and financial hubs of countries in north-eastern China, solving the problem of China's vulnerability in various vulnerable regions. For example, in the mid-1990s, experts said that some others might establish a "no-fly zone" on Tibet to thwart China's movements and operations to compete with Tibetan separatists. Was raised (Ehteshami & Horesh, 2019). US air provision in Central Asia and Afghanistan has raised Chinese concerns about the threat the US Air Force poses to western China (Arduino, 2017). In an article published in the newspaper, it was pointed out that the newly established US-Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, with the help of senior Chinese officers, is 100 kilometres away from the Chinese border. s Boundary line (Sullivan, 2018). US

operations have seriously jeopardized the security of China's westernmost location, and China is still not sticking to the conservation movement (Lai, 2020). Recently, China's experience of vulnerabilities to U.S. forces located on its side or at the border was enhanced by the use of a helicopter miraculous attack with the help of a Navy seal deployed in Pakistan in 2011 (Ahmed, 2016).

#### **Some Other Powers:**

Turkey, India, and Iran have influence in Central Asia. China has seen Iran and India as places of interest in the region but seems to be more introverted to Ankara (Reardon-Anderson, 2018). China has a good relationship with Iran and no longer considers it a competitor (Tabatabai & Esfandiary, 2018). On the other hand, China is, of course, the only individual in kinship with India, even if long-standing problems have hurt bilateral relations (Obstfeld, 2020). India has an air force base in Ayni, Tajikistan, 10 km northeast of Dushanbe, near the border with Afghanistan. The lowest associations include trilateral cooperation between Russia, India, and Tajikistan (Peyrouse, 2010). That said, China is no longer seeing India as a threat to Central Asia. Iran and India attended the SCO Conference (Norling & Swanstrom, 2007). Therefore, Turkey chooses a negotiation scenario with the useful resource of using China instead of Iran and India (Kibaroglu & Caglar, 2008). PLA's Chinese general Liu Yazhov cited Turkey as a good example of secularization and democratization in Islam, which belongs to the world of Turkey. Culturally, Turkey was proclaimed the location of the ancestors of the entire Turkish people, along with the Uighur population (Akcapar, 2009). Turkey is rustic and inhabited by nearly 40,000 Uighurs, making it an important base for Uighur dissidents in the 21st century. The turmoil in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has caused anxiety in Turkey and beyond on exceptional Muslim sites around the world (Scobell et al., 2014, pp.19-24).

#### **Discussion and Analysis:**

China-Central Asia plays a major role in international financial and political affairs without uncertainty (Zhang et al., 2019). China has a green financial system and is sticking to how to rebuild and start the world. The opportunities created through the use of its vast market provide a strong basis for any state (Storm, 2018). China can also actively represent the growing state's hobbies in international affairs (Raymond, 2017). At the same time, the five states that makeup Central Asia is corridors of east-west and north-south interactions by land. China and the Central African Republic are located in geographic features with very important strategic implications and can have an immediate impact on global finances, security, and balance (Zheng, 2020). ..

China and the Central African Republic are currently engaged in a variety of international financial and political relations. The forces holding an equivalent coalition are currently indulging in fierce conflicts and numerous countermeasures (Shakhanova & Garlick, 2020). But China and the Central African Republic can develop relationships with all powers at the same time, without thinking about thought or geopolitics. Globalization trends and advances in technology and age have improved the case of China and Central African countries (Chen, 2020). The threats faced in terms of China's territory and geopolitical ties are of great importance given that geopolitical territories are analysed internally and externally. The outside world of China consists of the East China Sea and the Pacific coast. Locations of Siberia in Russia on the Korean Peninsula and northeast. Mongolia is in the north. To the northwest is the border of the mountainous regions of Central Asia between Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

To the southwest are the huge Himalayas that surround India, Nepal, and Bhutan. In the southeast, there may be locations in Indochina adjacent to Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos. The geopolitical situation within China is divided into mainland China and parts of the surrounding buffer zones outside of China. Central China is settled using a wide range of

Chinese populations, and the outer buffer zone contains a non-Han Chinese population. It is important to know that there are more than 1000,000,000 people living in this area. Central China is located in the major rivers on the north and south sides, especially the Yangtze and Yangtze River basins, and the adjacent areas are nomadic areas. A belt of territory other than Han is adjacent to this center. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Tibet, Manchu, Mongolia. These are buffer zones recorded as being under Chinese control when China prospered and was sliced during its weakening. The importance of these non-Han Chinese areas to China may be that cultivating these areas not only provides a buffer but also provides a defensive border with China. In terms of internal geopolitical integrity, mainland China is a strategically safe place, controlling the buffer zones of Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.

### **Conclusion:**

This study shows that China attaches great importance to its involvement in Central Asia. She moves into the region as a strategy to achieve the energy business, security, harmony, and profitability of neighbouring countries by expanding the struggle for mutual benefit, cooperation, breaking barriers, and maintaining peace. I like to show involvement. All survey questions in this survey are analysed throughout the survey. Promoting China's economic development and prosperity means promoting trade and investment with neighbouring countries and protecting new energy sources. Economic interest and energy cooperation are important drivers (Ziegler, 2006). China has moved to take advantage of the mutual economic relations between the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In all these states, China has maintained mainstream state-owned economic relations and has endeavoured to promote energy relations, trade, transfer links, and investment (Molchanov, 2009). Russia and China shook hands to reduce the presence of the United States and Europe in Central Asia. The exclusion of the United States from Uzbekistan and the abandonment of Europe in the region favoured Russia and China (Houman & Basak, 2019). SCO has served as a barrier to foreign influences in Central Asia, but unlike the United States and Europe, it is not a major structure, but it is still used in Russia and China (Hoh, 2019). China's involvement in Eurasia can be seen as a broader challenge to US hegemony and Russia's capabilities, reflecting China's global desires (Gurcan, 2019). This means China's dominant global system, Johnston, a challenge to the United States that wants to challenge in 2019. Therefore, Eurasia gives China the opportunity to realize its claim to be a great power (Harper et al., 2017, p. 6).

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