

## The Different Fates of the Mughal and Manchu Empires are Explained by Changes in Their Ability to Adapt to Cultural Diversity during Territorial Expansion

**Dr. Qu Qiumei**

Department of History & Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

**Corresponding Author** [qqm13099841256@163.com](mailto:qqm13099841256@163.com)

### ABSTRACT

*In the 18th century, the Mughal Empire and the Qing Empire administered their own states, and in the process of territorial expansion, the Mughal Empire reached its maximum territorial extent during the reign of Aurangzeb, and after the death of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire rapidly declined. At the same time, the Qing Dynasty entered the Central Plains, in order to consolidate the central power, it advocated "Manchu and Han" and "Huayi family". And by cozying up to Tibetan political and religious leaders, the Qing Dynasty strengthened its influence in Mongolian and Tibetan areas, which played an important role in consolidating its ties with Tibet and Qinghai and Mongolia, and eventually achieving national unification.*

**Keywords:** The Mughal Empire, The Manchu Empire, Territorial Expansion Cultural Diversity

### Introduction

Historical records show that the Mughal Empire ruled from 1526 to 1857, the Manchu dynasty ruled from 1636 to 1912, and the Mughal Empire reached its maximum territorial extent in 1707. Although the decades-long Maratha rebellion in southern India was not suppressed by Emperor Aurangzeb, until his death there seemed to be no direct rival that could threaten Mughal hegemony in the region. Similarly, by eliminating the Zheng Alliance in 1683, the Qing consolidated its hegemony over China's Confucian core in the early 18th century, while also eliminating the last vestiges of anti-Qing restoration on the mainland.

However, after the 18th century, the Mughal Empire and the Qing Empire had very different fates. For the Mughals, except in May 1857, when an anti-British uprising broke out against the British colonists. With the exception of Bahadur Shah II, the last Mughal emperor of India, Aurangzeb was the last powerful emperor of the dynasty. Since the Mughals lacked clear rules of succession to the throne, violent struggles between the Timurid princes became inevitable after 1707 (Richards, 1991, P.253) . Unsurprisingly, when Aurangzeb died at the age of nearly 90, he left behind an empire that was overextended militarily and increasingly polarized along regional and cultural lines (Richards, 1991, P.253). This, coupled with the succession struggles that followed Aurangzeb, produced a series of increasingly weak and lethargic rulers who failed to assert their authority against a backdrop of rising aristocratic discontent and regional rebellions (Fisher, 1995, p.212). The Mughals were unable to maintain public order - especially in the chaotic southern parts of the empire - while encouraging rulers in the provinces to hoard tribute instead of sending it to the empire's capital. This

simultaneously laid the groundwork for the emergence of more closely held regional successor states, while also undermining the financial foundations of the Empire (R.P.Sana, 2006, P.20). Faced with a downward spiral of legitimacy, military power, and financial capacity, the Mughals became more vulnerable to internal rebellion and external depredations. In 1739, the Persian warlord Nadir Shah sacked Delhi and looted the imperial Treasury, highlighting Mughal incompetence (M. Axworthy, 2009, P.213). The disaster marked the end of the empire as a viable regional hierarchy, heralding a bloody, decades-long transition period that eventually led to the fall of the Mughal Empire and the rise of British rule in India.

In contrast to the fate of the Mughal Empire, after the Manchus defeated their internal rivals, the Manchus embarked on a series of successful military campaigns that doubled the size of the empire by the end of the 18th century. During this period, large swaths of new territory, including Tibet and Xinjiang, fell under Manchu control, while the Manchus simultaneously consolidated Qing dominance in the multi-ethnic border regions of the southwest (Di Cosmo, 2002, P.288). Even achieved Manchu dominance in the coastal areas of East Asia (J.-Y. Lee, 2016, P.223). At the same time, the Qing Dynasty also made the unique achievement of pacifying the eastern Eurasian steppe, while strengthening and consolidating control over the Central Plains (generally Perdue, 12a). Through clever diplomacy, military logistical innovations, and ethnic integration, they eliminated their last steppes rival, the Junggar Federation, and consolidated their hegemony over the steppes and the eastern Eurasian seaboard (generally Perdue, 12a).

Beginning in the 17th century, both the Mughal Dynasty and the Manchu Empire embarked on ambitious plans for territorial expansion. In the end, however, the differences were striking. The Mughal empire declined and created opportunities for later British colonial rule. On the contrary, the Manchu Dynasty successfully realized expansionism. Why did the Manchus succeed and the Mughal Empire fail? This paper explains the divergent fates of the Mughal and Manchu empires primarily by reference to their changing ability to continue to adapt to cultural diversity as they expanded their territory.

### **The Racial Integration of the Qing Emperor and the Racial Segregation of Aurangzeb**

Starting from the sixteen States and the Northern Dynasty, Buddhism emerged in South Asia, which became the junction and bridge connecting the culture of "Huaxia - Confucianism, Taoism - Buddhism (Buddhism)" and the culture of "Barbarian Jundi - Shaman". When the "Barbarian Jundi" entered China, almost all of them changed the "Huaxia - Confucianism" culture and ideology to the "official orthodox" ideology, while taking the deification of Buddhism as the auxiliary ideology and the political and cultural link point between the dynasty and the non-farming region. What the Qing

Dynasty did was to refine, effectively and even modernize this ruling mode (Wu Qina, 2017, p.19).

Before entering the customs, the Later Jin Dynasty, Tibet and Mongolia decided their respective roles in the future new East Asian political order under the framework of religious politics: the political and religious upper classes of Tibetan Buddhism came to the spiritual world of East Asia as ideological leaders; The political and military forces of Mongolia and Manchuria were the protectors of Tibetan Buddhism; The later Jin emperor of Manchuria, as the embodiment of the wise Manjusri (Manjusri Bodhisattva), ruled the secular world (Wang Junzhong, 1997, p.19). This structure became the foundation for the Qing Dynasty to rule the inner Asia outside the Central Plains after entering the customs. During the three dynasties of Kang Xi, Yong Zheng and Qian Long, the emperors themselves, while enamoring Buddhist teachings, especially Zen, attached great importance to the political function of using Tibetan Buddhism to deify Qing rule (Fuhui, W. super Yi, 1751, vol.118). In addition to supporting the legitimacy of the Qing Dynasty's rule over the entire Han and non-Han regions with the religious and political discourse of Tibetan Buddhism, the Qing Dynasty also regarded Tibetan Buddhism as an effective political tool to rule the Mongolian and Tibetan regions, and clearly clarified the primary and secondary relationship between the two. Li Qin Wang Zhao-durian clearly expressed the idea of the court: "The state favors the yellow monk, not to worship its religion to pray for good luck, but only to the Mongolian ministry to worship the yellow religion for a long time, so set up a religion to God, by relying on its disciples, so that it is sincerely attached to the barrier (Durian & Miscellany, 1999, p.251)." Emperor Gaozong of Qing Dynasty also clearly declared, "The reason for maintaining the yellow religion in this dynasty is that all Mongols have converted to it, because they show respect, and in accordance with the common and appropriate measures." "Bandits respect no two laws, related to the situation of all vassals (Records of Emperor Gaozong, Volume 1427)."

Under this concept of "peace under the world", the Manchurian regime established the "Mongolian Yamen" as early as the first year of Chongde (1636), and quickly reformed and expanded it into the "Lihan Yuan" to manage the political, economic and cultural affairs of various ministries in Mongolia and Tibet in the form of religion. In fact, as early as before entering the customs, in order to attract the Mongolian departments to join, Emperor Taizong and Emperor Taizong of the Qing Dynasty pursued the policy of protecting temples and supporting Buddhism, but did not confuse the relationship between means and goals, and thus opposed the people of the later Jin headquarters and districts to believe in Gelug school. In the seventh year of Emperor Taizu's mandate of heaven in Qing Dynasty (1622), Nurhachi said at a banquet for Beledjei, who had returned to Mongolia, "Our customs are still loyal, in accordance with the law, and those who are virtuous and good are not left; The perverse and disorderly will not be treated... The Mongolian children, abandoning their Mongolian language and name, learn lamas, and die to the decline of the country." In the thirteenth year of Tiancong (1636), Emperor Taizong of the Qing Dynasty informed

his ministers: "Lamas and others have made false statements, in the name of offering Buddha to keep the commandments, hidden evil, coveting property and disobedience to create SINS, and demanding wealth and livestock from people, claiming that they have absolved people from sin in the dark world, and their actions are even worse." Lamas are only here on earth, creating SINS and deceiving the ears of the ignorant. As for the ghost, who is he, and is he absolved of sin? Today's lamas should be called vain people, not lamas. It is believed that Mongolia and other lamas will spend money, repent of SINS, and seek the soul of the ghost. It is the thing of having a hanging wheel and tying a cloth flag. Very foolish. It shall be prohibited thereafter (Records of Emperor Taizong of Qing Dynasty, Volume 28)." After that, in order to further win over the political forces of Mongolia and Tibet, the Qing Dynasty changed its initial policy of banning Buddhism and allowed the banner people to believe in Buddhism, but the original intention of treating Tibetan Buddhism as a tool to "secure the world" remained unchanged.

The Qianlong period (1736-1795) was the period when the ethnic political structure of the Qing Dynasty was perfected, and its policy design to achieve effective rule of Mongolia and Tibet by supporting Tibetan Buddhism achieved unprecedented success. In contrast to the Mughal Empire of the same period, Akbar was the third heir to the throne of the Mughal Empire, and during his reign, the Mughal territory covered all the provinces of Hindustan, including Kabul in the west, Bengal in the east, Himalayan Kashmir and Kandesh in the Deccan. During the forty years of Emperor Akbar's reign, when he died in 1605, the Mughal Empire not only secured this vast territory, but also reached its height. He united Hindus and Mohammedans, Shiites and Sunnis, Rajputs and Afghans, and all the races and tribes of Hindustan under one government, which was sound during his reign but was later destroyed by the Puritans of his successors, especially his great-grandson Aurangzeb. Akbar's goal was to build a national empire through national religion. If the Mughals were to maintain control of the country against the onslaught of new armies of invaders, they had to rely on the local Hindus, the majority of the population, to provide them with a quota of troops, and to reuse them so that they could do most of the civil work. He therefore established a state religion which could be accepted by all his subjects. For the past two hundred years, the project of such a universal religion has been the dream of Hindu reformers and the text of wandering preachers across India. By Akbar's time, many sacred sites had become sacred sites for both faiths: Muslims worshipped the imprints on the rocks as if they were the footprints of their prophets, while Hindus worshipped the footprints of their prophets as if they were the footprints of their gods (W. W. Hunter, 1887, p.213). The motto that can serve as Akbar's creed is recorded as follows:

*O God, in every temple I see people that see thee, and in every language I hear spoken, people praise thee.*

*Polytheism and Islam feel after thee.*

*Each religion says, 'Thou art one, without equal.'*

*If it be a mosque, people murmur the holy prayer; and if it be a Christian Church,*

*people ring the bell from love to thee.*

*Sometimes I frequent the Christian cloister, and sometimes the mosque.*

*But it is thou whom I seek from temple to temple.*

*Thy elect have no dealings with heresy or with orthodoxy: for neither of them stands behind the screen of thy truth.*

*Heresy to the heretic, and religion to the orthodox,*

*But the dust of the rose-petal belongs to the heart of the perfume-seller.*

He discarded the rigid tenets of Islam, and adopted in their stead an eclectic pantheism, in which he incorporated whatever he found admirable in various creeds.

*'I can but lift the torch*

*Of Reason in the dusky cave of Life,*

*And gaze on this great miracle, the World,*

*Adoring That who made, and makes, and is,*

*And is not, what I gaze on – all else, Form,*

*Ritual, varying with the tribes of men .* (my History of the Moghul Emperors illustrated by their Coins, 1895, pp. xv ff.)

He even married wives of different races and religions to prove his tolerance, and this openness was reflected in the abolition of all taxes imposed on people who did not conform to their religious beliefs. The odious Islamic poll tax imposed on non-believers has also been abolished. In Akbar's eyes, all people are equal and nothing is "common or unclean." To mitigate racial prejudice, he gave local Hindus, Persian pagans, orthodox Afghan and Mughal Sunnis equal opportunities to hold state and army posts, and gave equal honors to each sect. In order to form a loyal legion of leading figures of all races and faiths directly attached to the crown, he established a feudal, but not hereditary, aristocracy called the mansabdars, who received salaries or land from the king in exchange for military service. The strict system of inspection and careful supervision of the rent collectors imposed on the danger that this group of life nobles might develop into territorial nobles were minimized (Dryden, 1892, p.55). For nearly a century, the Indian and Persian nobility served loyally to their common monarch. Only when religious intolerance weakens its power will it collapse.

Akbar's son Salim ascended to the throne in October 1605 at the age of 37 under the title Jahangir, either out of liberal thought or indifference, and though he called himself a Muslim, he showed the same tolerance towards Hindus and Christians as Akbar. He was also a patron of Christian art, and paintings of the Virgin were part of the decoration of his palace. But, towards the end of his reign, he came under the influence of his imperious queen, the famous Nur Jahan. Nur Jahan was greedy and plundered, and no minister ever thought of coming to the Queen empty-handed.

In November 1627, Jahangir died suddenly at the age of 58. His son Shah Jahan succeeded to the throne, and like his grandfather Akbar, he hired Hindus to command his army. He was known for his kindness, which endeared him to the people. No Mughal emperor was so beloved as Shah Jahan. Shah Jahan's reign was noted primarily



for its peaceful approach. A Hindu writer of the time, like his Islamic and Christian contemporaries, praised the justice of Shah Jahan's rule, his wise management of the land, his fair administration of the law, and his strict management of the accounts that made the country prosperous.

It was not until Aurangzeb succeeded to the throne that he executed the followers who had paved the way for him to ascend the throne, leading critics to condemn him. Critics have forgotten a proverb used by Sultan Bayazid when negotiating with his brother Prince Cem: "Blood ties don't matter." They do not remember the lesson that Eastern history repeatedly taught Aurangzeb, and many others before and after him: a prince's deadliest enemy is his own family. Even if Aurangzeb's quest for the throne had reached such a bloody level, it was forgotten by his passion for his faith and unwavering adherence to Islamic law and practice. Even Aurangzeb could give up the dream of power and return to the ascetic ideals of his youth, but Dara and Shuja were infidels, and Aurangzeb, as a true Muslim, had a duty to drive them off the throne, and besides, the thirst for power burned in his blood. Death or life imprisonment were the alternative fates of rivals for the throne, and Aurangzeb chose death. It was shocking, but safe, and generally kind, but to the broad-minded, it might not be acceptable.

Although he has been called a hypocrite, there has never been any evidence that he has violated the precepts of his religion, nor any evidence that he has violated his conscience.

It could be said that Aurangzeb was a stern Puritan through and through. On the religious front, he persecuted Hindus and destroyed their temples, while imposing high taxes on religious nonbelievers. In the latter part of the reign, all import duties imposed on the goods of Muslim merchants were abolished; But the rule was changed so that a 5 percent tariff on Hindu goods was imposed on Muslim goods at 2.5 percent. For religious purposes, he waged endless wars in the Deccan, not so much to expand the empire's boundaries as to bring the pagan Shia lands under the rule of Orthodox Islam. For him, Deccan was Dalhab, and he decided to turn it into Dal Islam. Religion made Aurangzeb completely renounce the pleasures of the senses, as if he had really become the ascetic he had once aspired to be. He doesn't eat any food, only water. So, as Tavernier put it, "the long fasting had made him thin and weak." He not only memorized the Qur 'an, but also copied it twice in his beautiful calligraphy and sent the richly decorated manuscripts to Mecca and Medina as gifts. Except on pilgrimage, he dared not venture out lest the throne be taken. Even the English merchants of Surat, who had their own reasons for disliking the emperor, could only tell that Aurangzeb was an "ardent professor" of Islam and "never neglected pious hours or anything that in his opinion would prove him to be a sincere believer (Dryden, 1892, p.55)."

A contemporary historian who lived for some time in the court, who describes in detail the religious practices of the Grand Mughal (Dryden, 1892, p.55), records in

the truest way the religiosity of Aurangzeb; "The emperor was a man born to worship God, and his devotion to religion is remarkable. He was a follower of the teachings of Imam ABU Hanifa and established the five basic teachings of Kanzi.

After taking a bath, one always devoted the greater part of his time to the worship of the gods and to the usual prayers, first in the mosque and then at home, whether in assembly or in private, most reverently. He observed the prescribed fast on Fridays and other holy days and read Friday prayers at the Jami Mosque along with ordinary members of the Islamic community. He kept vigil throughout the holy night, illuminating the lamps of religion and prosperity with the light of God's grace. Out of his piety, he stayed all night in the mosque of his palace, with pious people. In private he never sits on a throne. Before he ascended the throne, he had given away part of his lawful allowance of food and clothing, and now he had given away the income of several villages for the same purpose... And the salt pans. He kept them all for himself. Throughout Ramadan, he is expected to fast, perform the month's designated prayers, and read the Holy Quran at gatherings of religious figures and scholars, for which purpose he is expected to sit for six, sometimes nine, hours at night. During the last ten days of each month he worshipped at the mosque, and, although there were obstacles which prevented him from continuing his pilgrimage to Mecca, the facilities and assistance he provided to facilitate the pilgrimage of pilgrims to the Holy Land may be considered equivalent to pilgrimage. He never wore clothes forbidden by religion, and he never used gold and silver utensils. In his hallowed court there is no place for improper talk, no place for backstabbing or lies to exist..... Two or three times a day he appeared in his court, with an affable expression on his face, to do justice to those who came in droves and without hindrance; When he listens to them with all his attention, they offer their opinions without fear or hesitation, and receive compensation from his impartiality. If someone talks too much or behaves inappropriately, he never gets upset and never frowns. His courtiers often wished to forbid people from showing such boldness, but he said that by hearing their words and seeing their gestures he had developed a habit of tolerance..... Driven by anger and passion, he never orders death.....

This is a characteristic of a strict Muslim. This is perfectly sensible in the judgment of everyone who knows the true strict Muslim life, such as the strict Wahhabi life. Everywhere in this portrait is consistent with the whole theme of Aurangzeb. For the first time in history, the Mughals saw in their emperor a strict Muslim - a Muslim who was strictly repressive to himself and to those around him, a king who was prepared to sacrifice his throne for the sake of his faith. He must have known that compromise and reconciliation were the easiest and safest policies in an empire of different races and religions. When he ascended the throne in Delhi, he was not a young zealot, but a mature man of forty, with deep experience of the policies and prejudices of the different classes of his subjects. To deliberately oppose his Persian disciples, to alienate them, to restrain his nobility by suppressing the extravagance of the hedonistic court, was to invite revolution. Yet he chose this path and stuck to it with indomitable

attitude and determination throughout his reign of nearly five decades. As he lay dying in the ruins of his Deccan army, an old man in his late nineties, with the fires of religious fervour burning in his soul, Aurangzeb had an invincible moral courage - a courage to stand up for his convictions without flinching. He showed this in his dealings with the powerful Persian Shi 'ites, but in his view Shi 'ites were the pillars of Akbar, who adopted the Persian solar year and approved the celebration of Noruz, the New Year festival, which was a national custom unique to Persia. One of Aurangzeb's first acts on taking the throne was to ban Norouz and restore the unwieldy calendar of Orthodox Islam. Scholars and mathematicians have pointed out in vain the inconveniences of the lunar calendar for administration, tax collection, seasonal adjustment, harvest, and many other things. Because they did not take into account the fact that the lunar system that a wise man like Aurangzeb had in mind was the calendar of the Prophet Muhammad, any decree issued by the Prophet Muhammad should have become law during Aurangzeb's reign. It may be said that in matters of religion the emperor was obstinate to the point of fanaticism.

The Buddhist doctrine pursued the idea of racial integration of life equality, and the promotion of Tibetan Buddhist governance in the early Qing Dynasty had a historical impact on the Mongolian nation, which was a milestone in the history of the Qing Dynasty's governance of Tibet and a strategic reflection of the Qing Dynasty's implementation of Tibetan Buddhist governance. Using Tibetan Buddhism, the Qing Court made a strategic decision to combine the psychological function of religion with the military use of troops. Of course, the most important thing is that the Tibetan Buddhist policy implemented since the early Qing Dynasty has certain positive significance for the unification and consolidation of the multi-ethnic state in the Qing Dynasty. In carrying out this policy, Emperor Qianlong was able to respect the wishes of monks and laity according to the actual situation at that time, which was conducive to the stability of Tibet, and finally changed the mistakes left by the Kangxi Dynasty, corrected and completely solved the problems of the title and sequence of the Dalai Lama, and greatly improved the authority of the Qing government in the "prosperous Kangxi Era"(Feng Zhi, 2002, p.29). Aurangzeb, on the other hand, abandoned racial integration in favor of a more strictly religious vision of empire. Downplaying pragmatism, there is no doubt that Mr Arangzeb has reshaped the empire along a clearer line of Sunni Islam. Such as the reintroduction of the poll tax and the pilgrimage tax for non-Muslims, the Akbar lists thirty-eight taxes that Akbar exempted or reduced, some of which were restored and increased at the time of the accession of Aurangzeb. Transportation duties and port taxes were imposed on the Indians, taxes on the "wealth of the Indians," imperial power over diamond mines, royal succession to all official properties, and tributes from various princes, among other measures. And Aurangzeb's pressure on non-Muslim nobles and vassal rulers to convert to Islam fomented resentment and rebellion, seriously threatening the stability of the Empire (S. Chandra, 1960, p322-40). In addition, the emperor's sectarianism alienated supporters of the empire. In April 1669, Aurangzeb was informed that the Brahmins of Benares and other Hindu centers were teaching "evil science" to their own people, including



Muslims, which the orthodox emperor would not tolerate. The heads of the churches issued orders to the governors of the provinces to willingly destroy the pagan schools and temples, and to give them stern orders to completely cease the teaching and practice of idolatry. All that was done was to set several iconic examples, thus warning Brahmins not to try to convert among true believers. The Temple of Vishnu at Benares was destroyed, and a splendid shrine at Mathura was razed to make room for a magnificent mosque. Deities found in temples were taken to Agra and buried under the steps of mosques so that devout Muslims could tread them with satisfaction. Three years later, Hindu fanatics broke out in Mewar an uprising of four or five thousand devout believers who called themselves "Satnamis", which caused no small trouble for the Imperial officers to suppress. Thousands of Satami gathered, took revenge on the officials, occupied Nanor, and began to tax and administer the area themselves. In the end, thousands of people were killed and the uprising was crushed.

Aurangzeb felt strong enough to impose strict Islamic rule over all of India. When the Rajputs learned that the stubborn emperor had reinstated Muhammad's ancient laws, imposing a tax on everyone who did not follow Islam - something that Akbar had scorned and Shah Jahan had not dared to think of - the Rajputs' anger was uncontrollable. Their rejection of the religious tax was the first serious rebellion he suffered during his reign, and Udaipur (Mewar) and Jodhpur (Marwar) united against him, with only Raja Ram Singh of Jaipur (Amber) remaining loyal to the Empire. Aurangzeb's insult to their leader and religion left a wound in the Rajputs that will never heal. A people that had been Mughal right-hand men at the beginning of his rule was now distant and would never again serve the throne without suspicion. The war goes on. The Mughals ravaged the rich lands of Udaipur, and the Rajputs retaliated by tearing down mosques and insulting Muslims. These cities were indeed in Aurangzeb's hands, but they were crowded with disheartened enemies who lost no time in attacking the invaders. King Udaipur was the main victim on Rajput's side, and he finally succeeded in reaching an agreement with Aurangzeb, who had grown weary of the struggle and was anxious to devote all his energies to Deccan affairs. The treaty gave Aurangzeb an opportunity to withdraw, but this did not appease the angry Rajputs. All Rajput, except Jaipur and the eastern regions, remained in a state of rebellion until the end of the rule. Had he not taxed heresy and interfered with their innate sense of dignity and honor, Aurangzeb might have been able to keep the Rajputs at his side as invaluable Allies in his long struggle in the Deccan. In fact, he alienated them forever. No Rajputraja will ever again rally his mountaineers to support the Mughals as he did in the days of Jay Singh. As long as the great Puritan sat on Akbar's throne, the Rajputs would not lift a finger to save him. Aurangzeb had to fight the enemy in the south without his right arm.

### **The Reaction of the Qing Emperor and Aurangzeb to the Rebellion**

In June 1683 (22nd year of Kangxi) Shi Lang led the army to attack Penghu. On April 14th, Lang set out from Tongshan more than 600 warships and more than

60,000 soldiers arrived at Penghu on 15th. On 16th Liu Guoxuan to guide soldiers against Shi Lang but set off guns to move to eight cover waiting wind. "The eight well springs are rare and not enough for ten people on weekdays; I suddenly spring Lang Army more than 60,000 people inexhaustible." "Guo Xuan smell of the eclipse cover to know the will of God in also (Xia Lin, 1892, p.210)." "Twenty-two has been carved south wind big south flow surge" Lang "then ordered to sail into. The wind Li boat quickly and quickly in the upper wind of the pressure to attack and squeeze all when a hundred "" there are firearms, fire ships in the wind to send smoke flames (Peng Sunyi, 1897, p.213)." Liu Guoxuan knew that the situation was defeated and rushed to flee the boat from the roar door to Taiwan and the whole army was destroyed. Shi Lang went to Penghu and won. Thousands of soldiers Shi Lang treated them well: all prisoners who wished to return to their parents and wives were sent by boat; All the wounded were given medical attention and paid for food and clothing. "The one who came down said, 'The kindness of the army and my own flesh and blood are too dead to repay (Peng Sunyi, 1897, p.213).' "" They also feel crying to legend that after hearing that Taiwan soldiers and people "Do not disintegrate and return to heart lest the king teacher does not come early (Peng Sunyi, 1897, p.213)." Liu Guoxuan was defeated from Penghu"Knowing that the will of God is there, the heart disintegrated and decided to surrender (Xia Lin, 1892, p.210)." he sent the delegation to Penghu with the watch, and Feng Xifan and others went to Shi Lang's army to beg for surrender. It should be said that under the situation of the master of the Qing army pressing the border, Zheng Shi knew the general situation and decided to return to the Qing Dynasty to avoid a vicious war on Taiwan Island, which was indeed a wise move in line with the historical trend should be affirmed. August 15 Shi Lang led Master to Taiwan to receive surrender. When Shi Lang's army came to Taiwan"People pot pulp on the road one after another; The sailors were prefabricated with Qing flags to welcome the King's division (Peng Sunyi, 1897, p.213)." Even to those who do not yield to the enemy also retranslated tribute..... Articles such as cloth were given to the public (Shi Liang, 1890, p.213)." Zheng Ke sent Zhu Shugui, king Jing of Ming Ning, to hang himself. At this point, the Zheng regime of Fengming Zhengshuo in Taiwan declared the fall of the Qing government and finally completed the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland. After the Qing government unified Taiwan, Shi Lang reported preferential treatment to Liu Guo-xuan and other people who were determined to return to the truth. According to Shi Lang's opinion, Kangxi made Zheng Ke the Duke of the Han Army, Feng Xifan the commander of the Han army, and Liu Guoxuan the General Army of Tianjin (Xu Liangguo, 2006, p.105), In addition, after the rebellion of the three vassals was put down, the Qing government made proper arrangements for the vassals and the troops who participated in the rebellion: Wu Sangui's troops were stationed at Shangyang Fort, forty miles east of Kaiyuan County, Liaoning Province, and served at the Tai Zhan,name Nikan(Han dynasty) (Guangxu "Jilin Dao Zhi" volume six,). After the death of Wang Fuchen, all his troops were laid off (Volume ninety-seven of the true record of Emperor Shengzu of the Qing dynasty.) After the Chaharburni rebellion was quelled, its party and various tribes were installed in Yizhou, Jinzhou and other

places (Volume fifty-seven of the true record of the Emperor of the Qing dynasty.). Those who conspired with SAN Han, such as Chen Menglei and Tian Qijiao, were spared death and sent to New Manchuria as slaves (Xie Guozhen, 1896, p.112). Shangxili, Geng Jingzhong, Kong Youde's subordinates, ShangZhixin brother's filial piety and other families under the Zhuang men, were respectively compiled into Zhenghuang、Xianghuang、Zhengbai、Zhenglan (Qianlong, 1885, p.28,) . The Qing government also set up eight flag garrisons in Jingzhou, Fuzhou and Guangzhou, and sent green battalions to guard Guangxi and Yunnan to strengthen its rule. The contrast between the Maratha uprising and the Mughal reaction was stark. Shivaji (born in May 1627, eight years younger than his great rival, Aurangzeb, who also presented himself as the protector of the Hindus against the Muslims, and whose policies and devotion to superstition both recommended him to the people and won their support) fought with light horse tactics and strong mountain forts. Just when Aurangzeb seemed capable of turning on Shivaji to nip him in the bud, he became embroiled in the battle for the succession. This created an opportunity for Shivaji to establish privileges, and Shivaji established a more complex administration. None of the other rebels of his generation - the Sanamis, the Sikhs, the Yousefzai, the Jats, the Africans - had achieved anything comparable (A. Jan Qaisar, 1965, pp. 239-40). By 1666, Shivaji had achieved so much success that the Mughals were unable to counter it and had to migrate south to Shivaji's homeland on a large scale. Then the empire went into decline. As a result, it is estimated that the Mughal Empire began to decline in 1666. In July 1659 Aurangzeb sent Shasta Khan (an uncle of Aurangzeb with a prominent title) south as governor of the Deccan against Shivaji. However, Khan remained ineffectuated in his camps in and around Puna for more than two and a half years, until Shivajir launched a massive raid in April 1663 that resulted in Khan losing a son, a thumb, and several followers. The attack on such a prominent and well-connected nobleman caused panic at court, disappointment for Aurangzeb and a loss of prestige for the Mughal Empire. Shasta Khan was disgraced and sent to Bengal, the penal province, where Aurangzeb refused to pay him condolences.

Shivaji first captured and sacked Surat in January 1664. Throughout the 17th century, Surat was undoubtedly the greatest port of the Mughal Empire in India, or in Taviniya's words, "the only port of the entire Great Mughal Empire (Jean Baptiste Tavernier, 1925, p.87)." In 1644, the value of goods passing through customs was about Rs 10,000. In comparison, the 16 ships sent east by the British east India Company between 1660 and 1640 had a total available fund of about Rs 3,000,000. In 1646-47, the land income standard of the fertile state of Gujarat was assessed at Rs 13,200; Based on the 1/3 ratio, we can estimate the agricultural output value of the whole state of Gujarat at about Rs 4 lakh (K. N. Chau-dhuri, 1965, pp. 22). It is clear that Surat and its trade were of considerable economic importance in Gujarat and throughout the Empire.

Prince Muazzam, the new governor of the Deccan, sat at Aurangabad with a large army and did nothing to stop the attack or intercept Shivaji when he returned to

the Deccan. In the city the officials were quartered in the impregnable castle and did not take any offensive action at all. Although they commanded an army of over 20,000 men (William Foster, 1923, pp. 296, 305.), Shivaji has only 1,000 people (Shivaji, 1992, p.95). Shivaji was the first rebel ever to capture a major Mughal town without immediate punishment, and his operation was unprecedented in scale and achievement. For a pious emperor, Surat was important not just economically and politically, it was a port for hajj ships leaving the Mughals for the Red Sea. Aurangzeb himself sent two large ships a year from Surat to the Red Sea to transport pilgrims free of charge. The chief figures of his harem and his nobles joined him in sending large donations to Mecca via Surat. More specifically, the importance of the Hajj, and the importance of Surat as a gateway. The path to the Red Sea is revealed in the gifts sent by Aurangzeb after his coronation. In 1662. The Persian king gave Aurangzeb a gift worth 422,000 rupees, and Aurangzeb gave 535,000 rupees in return; But in 1659, he sent shares to Mecca and Medina worth Rs 630,000 (Maasir-z-Alamgiri, 1996, pp. 17, 22) The sacking of this "sacred port" was an extraordinary affront to Aurangzeb, an affront exacerbated by the regular pillaging of Aurangzeb's pilgrimage ships by Shivaji's navy from the early 1560s (Shivaji,1992, p. 260).

So the first sack of Surat had a huge impact on Mughal prestige, far more significant than the more than 10 million rupees (10 million rupees) plundered by Shivajit. The memory lingered, unsettling the inhabitants of Surat and undermining the empire's prestige. Even in 1695, a European traveler discovered the collection in Surat (Surendranath Sen, 1949, p. 163). The commemoration was encouraged by Shivaji, who in 1664 and later boldly demanded an annual Chauth (protection money) from the town or would return the visit. As rumors of Shivaji's return spread, Surat was in a panic almost every year. The assumption of Mughal triumph was completely transformed into the assumption of Marat triumph within a few years, and in the most important and prestigious port of the Empire.

The Mughals responded to Shivaji's first attack. Immediately after the attack, the Governor of Gujarat came to the town with a sizable force and stayed there for three months. Mr Hollande sacked law-breaking officials and built walls; But to no avail. In October 1670, the defense against Sivaji's second attack was more fragile than the first; By 1677, things had reached such a point that the Maratha chiefs, with only a few soldiers, entered the city as if nothing had happened, arrogantly demanding food and money from the governor (Shivaji, 1992, pp. 311-12).

These two coups, the attack on Shasta Khan and the first raid on Surat, left Aurangzeb helpless. As Manucci said, he couldn't take Shivaji's insults any longer (Manucci, 1995, p. 112)." Sarkar summed up the importance of this: "The hundred victories since the second Panipat have convinced the Indian world that Mughal arms are invincible and Mughal territory is inviolable. Shivaji broke the spell (Aurangzeb, 1889, pp. 419-20)." Bernier, who left India in 1667, wrote that Shivaji "was exercising all the powers of an independent monarch, mocking the threats of the Mogols and

Visapur Kings..... His audacity and never-ending career distracted Aurangzeb..... How to pacify the WHO became the primary objective (Bernier, 1992, p.198). Aurangzeb apparently accepted this view not only in 1682, when he himself moved to the South, but even earlier. In 1670, at the court's internal meetings, Aurangzeb frequently asked anxiously whom he should send next to attack Shivaji, since almost all of his great generals had been defeated at the Battle of Deccan. As early as 1666, he was ridiculed by his arch-rival, Shah Abbas II of Persia: "You call yourself Padisha, but you cannot conquer a small people like Sivaji, I will go to India with an army and teach you the trade (Shivaji, 1992, p. 370)." Because of this, nobles like Jai Singh in 1665 and Jahan Bahadur Khan in 1675 who successfully fought against the Marathas were rewarded handsomely by the emperor (Maasir-i-Alamgiri, 1995, pp. 33, 88).

In 1665, Jai Singh, India's top general and supreme nobleman, was sent to the south with a large, well-supported army and full diplomatic authority. In a struggle with Shivaji, Shivaji was defeated and signed a treaty with Jai Singh in June 1665. Under the Treaty of Prandal, Shivaji was forced to cede 23 of his 35 forts, as well as 80% of its revenues. Shivaji thought that if Aurangzeb had given him a large bribe, or a highly placed Mansa, plus some freedom of movement in the Deccan, the two sides might have reached a settlement. But Mr Aurangzeb did not. Neither he nor his nobles were prepared to give Shivaji a position. How do they think the upper Rajputs or noble Persians would feel if a low-caste bandit, a mountain burglar, were elevated above them? Hollande knew this, and he probably also knew that giving too big a reward to a successful bandit would set a very dangerous precedent. So much so that Aurangzeb is unlikely to be too gentle with Shivaji.

The inability of Aurangzeb to integrate the political elite of South India (especially the Malata) into the dominant Indo-Persian court culture of the Empire, in contrast to the Qing's efforts to woo rebels, was not conducive to the long-term stability of the Mughal Empire.

### **Construction of the Reign of Qing Emperor and Aurangzeb**

Go on an inspection tour, Due to its long and complex history and the inherent openness of Confucian classics, it has multiple meanings and ideological influences (Wu Anzu&Zhou Qirong, 1997, pp. 1-5). The multiplicity of meanings was part of the appeal of the Tours to the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, each of whom used the Tours as a means of strengthening Qing rule. In addition, the southern Tours were part of a broader revival of the Tours in the 1680s and 1740s, which were also designed to promote the ideological construction of nation-dynastic rule in the Qing Dynasty.

On October 5, 1671, Emperor Kangxi embarked on the first important tour of the Qing Dynasty, which took the emperor and his party to Shengjing, the secondary capital of Manchuria, via the northern part of the Saibei. "Daily Life Notes" records that the Kangxi emperor himself admitted that this trip was "I have come to visit the ancestral home of the Emperor Taizu and the mausoleum of Taizong."(Liu Yulong&in



Shenjia, 2007, p.2) "The ceremony has been completed", he thought that "I have great comfort." (Levinson, 2003, pp.36-37) That is, the Kangxi emperor's reason for going to Shengjing was neither to follow the classical rules nor to practice benevolent governance, but for filial piety - more specifically, dynastic filial piety.

In 1682, Emperor Kangxi made a second trip to Shengjing, in 1683 to Wutai Mountain in the northwest of the mountain, and in mid-1683 and mid-1684, he went on a hunting expedition to the North of the Saibei (Xiao Tong, 2008, p. 109-111) . More importantly, the Kangxi emperor's first series of Tours in the 1680s were motivated not only by the ritual established by the Chinese classics, but also by the imminent military emergency and the ideological mission of national-dynastic rule.

In 1682, the Kangxi emperor returned to Shengjing in order to strengthen the Qing's defense of northern Manchuria. He sees it as an extension of the legacy of his ancestors.

Kangxi's first trip to the south in 1684 was not, as is commonly believed, merely an indication of the emperor's concern for the control of waterlogging (Dai Renzhu, 2010, pp. 145-146) . It was also the culmination of a massive restoration tour in the early 1680s, and it became part of a larger ideological effort of the Kangxi court to Shenchang national-dynastic rule. According to this ideology, the Manchurian court was typical of military rectification, diligent administration, and leniency. The pilgrimage was the most important ritual, through which this national-dynastic virtue could be spread throughout the country.

Hunting was held to improve the discipline and morale of the envoys and officials, and the more general sense of the tour was also considered to be a comprehensive rectification of official officials, as it brought to Zhili: "Zhili is better than other provinces, isn't it the bright effect of frequent visits to provinces?" Emperor Qianlong said that go on an inspection tour must, which mainly stems from the ideological belief in asserting national-dynastic privileges in the fields of literature and military (Ye Shi, 1989, p. 6222). The Qianlong Emperor resumed traveling in the 1740s.

The Qing Emperor always believed that traveling was not optional, it was a must, because it was the cause and result of the motivation and vitality of the conqueror elite. The significance and purpose of the tour was to enhance the political prestige of the conqueror elite, which historically was a small part of the changing dynamics within the Qing regime. The Mughal emperors endeavored to bind to their personal interests a class of people, often of low birth, perhaps formerly slaves, and uneducated, who derived their power and wealth entirely from their monarchs, who either elevated them to noble status or relegated them to obscurity, according to their own preferences. This group is called Mansabdar. Each member received money or land income from the emperor. The ranks are distinguished according to the number of horses a Mansabdar should have: a Mansadar has 500, 1,000, 5,000, or even 12,000 horses. Higher grades, counting from more than 1,000 horses, received the title of Amir, which

the writings of European travelers referred to as nobility, a concept that was purely official and not necessarily linked to birth or hereditary property. However, the term "Amir of 5,000 men" does not imply that 5,000 cavalry follow, it is merely a rank title, and the number of cavalry that each amir must retain is set by the King himself. A 5,000-strong amir is sometimes restricted to 500 horses. In fact, he often took much less money than he actually received, and since he was falsely reported as effective force and stopped the wages of a portion of the workers, the concessionaires enjoyed a large income. However, the huge expenses of the court, the extravagance and vast establishment of the Amirs, and the lavish purchases of gifts they were forced to make to the emperor at annual festivals, drained their resources and plunged them deep into debt. The property and lands of the Amir, as well as those of the lower class Mansabdars, were at the disposal of the emperor alone. After the assignee's death, his title and all his property became legally owned by the Crown, and Mansabur often managed to secure a grant for his sons during his own lifetime. Moreover, the discreet Amirs, or their heirs, were adept at hiding their wealth so as to frustrate the laws of imperial succession, and the cavalry units provided by the Amirs and the smaller Mansabdar and their minions made up the bulk of the Mughal standing army, with the army budget taking up a considerable portion of the empire's revenue. Although the emperor kept the army and nobility in his own hands through a system of granting land or money in exchange for military service, civil administration followed the same principle. In provincial administration, the characteristics of civil and military are mixed together. The governors of the provinces were Mansabdar, who received a grant of land in lieu of wages for maintaining their state and army, and they were required to pay the emperor about a fifth of their income. All the land of the kingdom was thus distributed to some aborigines, who extorted money from the poor peasants who tilled their land in their own jurisdiction. Except for the royal estates, which were leased to contractors. Since it was the consistent policy of the Mughals to frequently move vassals from one rank to another in order to prevent them from gaining permanent influence and prestige locally, destabilizing consequences followed. Every governor or feudal Lord tried to squeeze all he could out of his province in order to hold the capital when he was moved or dispossessed. Their authority in the outlying areas was practically supreme, for no one could lodge a complaint against their tyranny and oppression except to the emperor himself, and they took great care not to have their proceedings reported to the court.

Compared to the Qing emperor's travels, it is clear that Mughal rule in India was more like an occupying force. In short, Aurangzeb has pursued an executive policy of sacrificing the welfare of the people in exchange for armed minority rule.

### **The Tax System of Qing Emperor and Aurangzebu**

After the rebellion of San Francisco was put down, Kangxi announced the abolition of all kinds of abuses carried out by San Francisco. The specific measures were: all the taxes collected by the San Francisco were prohibited. "Subject to system tax"( Yunnan General Annals, Vol. 29, Art and Literature IV.) Cancel all the orders of

San Francisco to plunder the land, and convert the Mu's Xuzhuang fields occupied by Wu Sangui into nearby prefectures, "According to the people's food" (Yunnan General Annals, volume 10, Land Fu) ; The one million "Private tax" levied by Shangfan each year was used to replenish the country's military supplies (Volume ninety-one, Bingshu, autumn of 19th Kangxi) . In addition, the Qing government also left Shang Han in the SAN Han rebellion still good at salt and iron heavy profits Clarifying Sumin" (Volume forty-two, biography of Wu Xingzuo.) This has reduced the burden of the vast majority of working people, and the dilapidated situation in the southeast coast and southwest began to improve. In contrast to the Mughal Empire, Aurangzeb, shortly after taking the throne, built houses to distribute free dinners in areas where famine caused by drought had led to mass migrations of warring armies, and ordered the reduction of some 80 taxes, including road and ferry tolls, land taxes on houses and shops, and other taxes that were probably abolished for religious reasons. Such as taxes on Hindu and Islamic bazaars, liquor licenses, gambling hells and infamous houses. But with the connivance of the Imperial inspectors, local officials and landowners did not abate these taxes, though this was the fault of the corrupt administrators, not the emperor. But the royal anger was short-lived, and the criminals were soon forgiven and returned to their former ways of oppression. The emperor's rule was so gentle that throughout the territory of the Empire there was no fear of punishment in the minds of the officials of the provinces and districts, with the result that administrative corruption and oppression were more severe than under the watchful reign of Shah Jahan (Bernier, 1992, pp.155-161) . To interpret the exemption of taxes simply as an act of generosity, as prescribed in the Qur 'an's mercy exhortation to the "poor and sons of the road," is in keeping with what we know of the temperament of the Mughal emperors.

The Mughal emperors themselves continually levied taxes, and after the reintroduction of the poll tax around 1675, there would have been a considerable increase in revenue, and it is recorded that the city of Burhampur alone paid 26,000 rupees for this tax, and if this tax was ever strictly enforced, the total tax for the whole of Hindustan must have been enormous. Poll taxes on Indians, transportation duties and port taxes, taxes on the "wealth of Indians," imperial power over diamond mines, royal succession to all official properties, and tributes from various princes. The port tax in Surat amounted to Rs 3 lakh and the tax on seigniorage profits in the same city was Rs 11 lakh. In other words, Surat contributed about £500,000 in addition to the land tax. In all, the total income of the Mughal Empire during Aurangzeb's reign may have reached £36 million in 1594 and gradually increased to £90 million by 1695. As Cathro says, "No doubt such vast wealth is astonishing, but it must be remembered that at least part of all this wealth entered the Mughal Treasury every year, and then flowed again into the land." Half the empire lives by the emperor's grace or at least under his control. Apart from the large number of soldiers who lived on wages, all the peasants who worked only for the monarch were supported by the monarch, and almost all the town craftsmen who worked for the Mughals were paid by the royal Treasury." Although the Mughal emperors had a great income, they spent so much money that

they could hardly save. Despite his vast savings and his long reign of peace, Shah Jahan "never accumulated sixty million rupees" except for jewels and ornaments, while Aurangzeb died leaving only 130 thousand rupees in the Treasury, which was less than 150,000 pounds, and which was often difficult to use to pay his army.

### Conclusion

There are two explanations for the rapid decline of the Mughal empire after Aurangzeb's death: excessive territorial expansion of the empire and a financial crisis in agriculture, or top-down religious polarization that hastened the collapse of the Mughal empire.

Marxist historians and political scientists have long attributed the decline of Mughal India largely to the fiscal crisis, which was a combination of geopolitical pressures and the imperfections of the imperial tax system (Habib, 1963, p.34-67) . Proponents of this view argue that the Mughal tax system contained potentially fatal tensions, which were finally exposed by the pressures of the Deccan campaign. For Marxist analysts of Mughal decline, the empire's overexpansion into the Deccan brought to the fore contradictions in the tax system. Specifically, they argue that the increased imperial revenues to finance the Aurangzeb war triggered a vicious cycle of predatory taxation, peasant rebellions, shrinking military finances, and political disintegration (Habib, 1963, pp. 367–8). It is widely believed that the pain caused by greedy taxes triggered a larger agricultural crisis in the Mughal economy, characterized by widespread peasant exodus and rebellion (Anievas&Nisancioglu, 1994, p.268). In addition to Marxist explanations, the historical literature on the decline of the Mughals is also dominated by an emphasis on the alleged lethal influence of Aurangzeb's religious fanaticism on the imperial constitution (J. Sarkar, 2009, p. 246). Aurangzeb's rejection of the Akbar-style fusion of Sunni orthodoxy undermined the model of legitimacy that had previously held the Mughal empire together. Aurangzeb's insistence on a Sunni Islamic notion of empire weakened the bonds of loyalty that had bound key non-Muslim imperial supporters, such as the Rajput warrior bloodline, to the Mughal order (Richards, 1999, pp. 183–4.) . Aurangzeb's abandonment of integration was a major cause of the Mughal Empire's decline. Aurangzeb's sectarian turn weakened the empire above all because it hollowed-out the center of the empire and, in particular, the Mughal court's position as the center of elite socialization into a common fusion service culture (Gordon, 2009, p. 79) . Mughal fusion formed an ideological glue that held the aristocracy together into a cohesive ruling service elite. Aurangzeb's sectarianism thus weakened the empire in the first place, because it marked the abandonment of the model of legitimacy that had made the elite attached to the emperor and the larger Mughal imperial cause. Mughal fusion was expressed through a unique Indo-Persian high culture that spread among the empire's elite through court-centered rituals, especially on the emperor's body. However, after Aurangzeb embraced orthodox Islam, imperial patronage of Indo-Persian high culture declined dramatically. As part of this ideological renewal, Aurangzeb downplayed the Mughal dynasty's traditional emphasis on the demigod of the emperor and its

charismatic status as the great mediator who brought the empire's diverse communities together (M. N. Pearson, 1976, pp.223–4). Aurangzeb, by contrast, leans more towards traditional Islamic notions of imperial power. These ideas gave the emperor less independent charismatic authority, and instead based his legitimacy on the status of a ruler who ruled fairly in accordance with Islamic precepts (Sheikh, 2005, p.559). Naturally, this notion of legitimacy had limited appeal among the largely non-Muslim Mansabdar elite, and Aurangzeb's increasing reliance on it weakened his loyalty to his most important collaborators.

Aurangzeb's sectarianism made it difficult to absorb and integrate the newly conquered territories. Apart from the Mughal Empire, the Marathas also became the most powerful indigenous polity in India and the last major threat to Indian empire building in the early 19th century. But during Aurangzeb's reign, the Mughals repeatedly defeated the Marathas in battle. Despite humiliating and political blows to major Mughal cities (including two attacks on Surat, the empire's most important port city), the Marathas at no time posed an existential military threat to the Mughal Empire. Instead, the threat they posed was more insidious, and they brought a general sense of insecurity to the empire's southern borders. This insecurity in turn reflected Aurangzeb's failure to politically subjugate the Marathas by incorporating their defeated leaders into the Mughal Empire. Again, this failure stems in large part from Aurangzeb narrow, sectarian vision of empire, which alienated the very intermediaries he needed to consolidate a favorable peace in the Deccan.

Aurangzeb mishandled his treatment of Shivaji, the father of Marathi polism, who was treated as a low-born noble at Aurangzeb's court and deliberately humiliated by the emperor. Aurangzeb regarded the leader as nothing more than a rebellious feudal Lord, a "mountain rat", and Aurangzeb dismissed his self-importance to the throne (Gordon, 2009, p. 84). But it was also because of a "cultural gap" between the Mughal court and the Marathas—a gap exacerbated by Aurangzeb's turn to sectarianism (Gordon, 2009, p. 84). As a result, Aurangzeb missed the opportunity to reconcile with Shivaji.

Aurangzeb's sectarianism also weakened the Mughal Empire in that under Aurangzeb's rule, Mughal persecution of Sikhs increased and acquired a more pronounced religious tone. Concerned about the growing political influence of Sikhs in Punjab, and angered by reports of their efforts to convert Muslims to Sikhs, Aurangzeb adopted a "ruthless policy of repression" against Sikhs (Bayly, 2007, p.188). This crackdown extended to the execution of Guru Teji Bahadur, a prominent leader of the Sikh religion, after he refused to accept Islam, and the demolition of Sikh gurdwarve (Grewal, 2010, p. 178). The martyrdom of Guru Bahadur and the desecration of Sikh places of worship produced predictably strong revenge in subsequent relations between Sikhs and the Mughals.

In short, the reasons for the fall of the Mughals are undoubtedly complex. It boils down to the fact that the Aurangzeb dynasty abandoned the fusion model that had



bound the different parts of the empire together. In stark contrast to the Mughal Empire, the Manchus owe much of their success to their successful management of cultural diversity. Specifically, after the success of the Manchus as conquerors, the Manchu model of national governance played a crucial role in holding together the coalition that suppressed the anti-Qing restoration.

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