

CAUSES AND IMPACTS OF ISLAMIZATION UNDER ZIA UL-HAQ (1977-1988)

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ABSTRACT

The political turmoil in Pakistan led to the implementation of General Zia Al-Haq's Martial Law administration on July 5, 1977. During Zia Al-Haq's rule (1977-1988), Islamization received a fresh impetus. He began an all-encompassing plan to rid the Pakistani state and society of anything that wasn't Islamic. The legal-constitutional, socio-economic, and educational institutions of Pakistan were all up for consideration in his programme of Islamization. The country adopted the tenets of the Zakt -'Ushr ordinance, the Islamic udd, and the Penal code. As part of the process of Islamizing the economy, riba was abolished and P&L accounting were introduced in banks. In addition, he rechristened parliament as Majlis Al-Shr, and he established the Federal Shar'at Court, the Shar'at Appellate Benches, and the Shar'ah Council. Some of the social changes made by Nizm-e-Mutafi include the promotion of women wearing headscarves (chadar) and the enforcement of gambling laws. Television and radio broadcasts deemed incompatible with Islam were censored, and the reading of the Arabic news was made mandatory. President Zia's Islamization initiatives had as their proclaimed goal the creation of a fully Islamic state in Pakistan. Those who disagreed with his policies saw this as an opportunity to boost his political standing.

Keywords: Islamization, Legal, Political, Socio-Economic, Reforms.

Introduction:

Zia announced his Islamization plan in his inaugural address to the Nation, saying, "It indicates that Pakistan, which was formed in the name of Islam, can continue to live only if it keeps to Islam. For this reason, I think it's crucial that the Islamic system be implemented throughout the country. In order to propose an all-encompassing system for the implementation of Shari'ah, Zia revived the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) of the 1973 constitution in November 1977. Under the constitution, CII's primary duty was to propose changes to the existing laws so that they better reflect the teachings of Islam as found in the Quran and the Sunnah. (Abidi 1988) In 1980, under the Zia government, a sizable number of Ulama were guaranteed a seat at the CII for the first time. Thirdly, Zia instituted an ongoing Law Commission charged with revising the legal system to better reflect modern concerns about social fairness and the need for efficient court processes. Other institutions in Pakistan were created or reformed, but Zia's government still had to figure out how to implement Shari'ah law. There was a school of Ulema that thought an Ordinance could do the trick. The gradual implementation of Shariah was a perspective held by others. (Ian Talbot 1988). The elimination of banking interest and the development of Islamic banking according with Shariah posed challenges for Islamic economics experts. Institutions such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and others were exploring various options for adopting Shari'ah. On February 10, 1979, two years after he took office, Zia declared with Allah's help, the current government has been able to grant the people's wishes. So much progress has been made in just over a year and a half that I am able to formally announce the implementation of the Islamic system across the country today. (Report 2006)

Methodology:

The study article draws on both official and unofficial sources, including primary and secondary sources published in a variety of archival works.

Factors behind Zia's Islamization?

Every change or new phenomenon has its roots in a confluence of circumstances. The Islamization of Pakistan's agenda was the result of a complex set of factors. The next part explains Zia's three primary goals with regard to Islamization.

Social Instability and Fragmentation:

Many Muslim and nationalist leaders opposed the division of the subcontinent from the beginning of the independence movement. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a member of the Congress Working Committee and a personal friend of Mahatma Gandhi, pushed for the creation of a separate state for Pashtuns. The establishment of Pakistan did not alleviate the suffering of its people; rather, it gave rise to a fresh round of complaints (Hamdani, 2009; Khan, 1969). The dominance of Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants from northern India in the military corps and civil bureaucracy sparked ethnic-nationalist movements among Bengalis, Pashtuns, Sindhi, and Baluchi. East Pakistan, now named Bangladesh, became an independent state in South Asia when Pakistan was sundered in 1971 due to prejudice against and neglect of the country's minorities by the majority Punjabi population. Pakistan was always an artificial state, made up of people of many diverse backgrounds and traditions. (Haqqani, 2005, p. 21). Although Islam bound together Pakistan's majority of residents, it was not enough to prevent the dissolution of the country's inorganic state. Z.A. Bhutto encountered many difficulties during his time as prime minister. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the head of one of his coalition parties, recently severed ties with the federal government, therefore rendering his administration illegal. In retaliation, Bhutto outlawed Khan's National Awami Party, had its leaders jailed, and toppled Khan's Balochistan Provincial government. The military officers involved in the 1973 attempted coup against Bhutto were arrested. The Pakistan National Alliance, a grouping of both religious and secular political groups, publicly contested the election's legitimacy in March 1977, alleging that it had been rigged. Protests and other forms of organised opposition to the Bhutto administration got underway. Zia apparently ousted the Bhutto administration and put Bhutto in prison as a result of the social upheaval, but Mazhar Ali stated that military coups in Pakistan have historically occurred mainly "to defend military's institutional interests" (Aziz, 2008, p. 79). Surendra Chopra writes that "Zia saw Islam as the only remedy for the nation's ills and raison d'etat of the state as well as the unity and strength of the nation". Civil unrest was momentarily quelled by the coup, but popular agitation against the Zia dictatorship began within a year. Despite promising an early election, he never held one. He declared Pakistan to be an Islamic and theocratic state, where even the president is acceptable. He played the Islamic card to justify his rule, calm the public down, and rally support for his Islamic mandates.

Political Legitimacy and Military Rule:

From 1968 until 1970, Bhutto managed and led a major demonstration against General Ayoob Khan's rule, and General Zia knew about his charismatic qualities because of this. Bhutto and his cabinet members were imprisoned on the first day of the coup (5 July 1977), but he was released from prison on the 29th. Zia first said elections would be held within 90 days, but then reversed course. Bhutto went on a speaking tour around the country, bringing together tens of thousands of supporters. Concerned by Bhutto's mobilisations, the military junta devised a scheme against him in the event of murder; on September 3rd, Bhutto was re-arrested and given a death sentence. According to Ayesha Siddiq, a leading Pakistani military expert, "Zia skillfully used the Islamization card and religious and ethnic parties — Islami Jamhoori Ittehad and Muttahida Quami Movement — to counter the influence of PPP in its stronghold Sindh province" (Siddiq, 2017, p. 102). Zia launched a new coalition of political parties called "Islami Jamhoori Ittehad" to limit the power of the PPP and its widespread protests against the government. In order to promote Zia's Islamization programme, religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (P) joined the administration. Bhutto's efforts to Islamize the country were met with opposition from various religious organisations, despite the fact that he enforced several Islamic rules, such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Muslims, closing nightclubs, and outlawing horse racing. He ran for office as a secularist but faced widespread backlash from religious groups, prompting a shift in his party's platform from "Food, Shelter, Cloth" to "Islam is our faith, democracy is our policy, and socialism is our economy." Zia and religious parties criticized Bhutto's Islamization efforts, Islamic

Socialism, and nationalization policy after the coup, declaring that socialism is a Kufur and not in keeping with the spirit of Islam. With the passage of an amended Political Parties Act in August 1979, Zia mandated that all political parties register with the Election Commission and "provide details of their fundings and expenditures and publish their formal manifesto." With this change, he exerted more control over political parties and prevented the PPP from registering because of its socialist ideology, which is contrary to Islamic teachings. "The localization of politics," Zia argued (Siddiq, 2017, p. 101), "would minimize the significance of PPP." To end Martial Law and ensure a free and fair election, Benazir Bhutto, Z. A. Bhutto's daughter, formed a coalition of eight political groups in 1981 called the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. Zia's military junta was concerned that this alliance might resuscitate mass support for the PPP (Haqqani, 2005, p. 138). Zia urged his religious allies to declare socialism to be Kufur and to condemn the PPP party's legitimacy. Zia later said that he would devolve some of his authority to local bodies and that elections would be held on a non-party basis. Despite Zia's numerous failed attempts to use the Islamic card against his political opponents in order to eliminate and isolate them from the political scene in Pakistan, the majority of PPP's sympathizers won the seats in the election. However, despite his actions, the Pakistan People's Party still plays a major role in national politics. The Islamization policy could have allowed Zia to consolidate his power. By aligning with religious groups and instituting Sharia law, he could suppress political opposition and control the societal narrative, ensuring his prolonged dominance. (Interview: Molana Yahya Abbasi Musheer)

To Reinforce National Identity:

Muslims in British India had been debating their collective future for decades prior to the independence of Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan was established as a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, but the country has yet to establish an Islamic government. Pakistan's founding ideology was based on the idea of an Islamic state, but the country has struggled with its own identity since its independence. A homeland for the Muslim and a democratic state where Hindus will have the same rights as Muslim, as Jinnah foresaw (Pervez A. Hoodbhoy, 1986), was the vision Jinnah presented for Pakistan's future. Many discussions on the future of statecraft and identity were postponed until 1956 because of Jinnah's vision, which undermines Pakistan's national identity. Psychologically, it was unsettling for many in Pakistan when East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) broke away in 1971. The Two-Nation Theory, Pakistani ideology, and Pakistan's statehood and national identity all came under heavy scrutiny. In the 1970s and 1980s, while a new national identity was being sought out, Islam was often reaffirmed as a national source of salvation. Former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi once declared that Jinnah's Two Nations Theory was dead thanks to Bangladesh's independence. So General Zia initiated an Islamization to resuscitate the Ideology of Pakistan in order to avert a crisis of national identity.

Legal reforms, the implementation of the Islamic Penal Code, economic reforms, and a new education strategy were all part of Zia's Islamization programme. (Karachi, 1979) This essay makes an effort to examine Islamization in Pakistan during the presidency of Zia Al-Haq (1977–1988). This article examines the effects of Zia's Islamization initiatives on Pakistan's governmental, political, economic, and social structures. The article's focus is on issues like, "What was Zia's Islamization policy?" Did his efforts to Islamize society result in improvements to the country's economic and social structures? What were the repercussions in Pakistan's judicial system, government, society, economy, and schools? And how did various groups and individuals in the country carry out his policies?

Legal and Judicial Reforms:

Legal reforms have been the most publicised and widely adopted among the many Islamic reforms considered for Pakistan under Zia's rule. Structure reforms, which were already present in Pakistan's legal institutions, were related to evidentiary and criminal reforms, while procedural and criminal reforms rounded out the package. (Kennedy, C. 1999)

On February 10, 1979, President Zia signed four new laws, generally referred to as the udd Ordinances, updating and altering Pakistan's penal code. The idea behind the udd Ordinance was to better align Pakistani law with Islamic principles. The laws pertaining to zin (adultery) and theft were updated. Each Ordinance, in line with its Islamic intent, differentiates between 'add (limit) and ta'zr (penalty for offences), two concepts that are described explicitly in the Quran and the Sunnah. For instance, if you steal something worth more than 4.457 grammes of gold from a secure location, you need two adult male witnesses who are not guilty of any big sins. Reference: (C. Kennedy, 1988) The evidential criteria, if met, proclaimed the theft subject to the amputation of his right hand in accordance with the udd Ordinances; if not met, the accused had to be sentenced under ta'zr; the punishment under ta'zr might include fine or imprisonment. According to Laiquat Baloch, the most prominent feature of Zia's Islamization policy was the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances. These laws, which included punishments for theft, adultery, and alcohol consumption, marked a significant shift towards Islamic legal principles in the country's judicial system. (Interview: Laiquat Baloch)

The criminal law system in Pakistan was barely affected by Zia's udd Ordinance's promulgation and enforcement. Many people, both in Pakistan and outside, worried that the udd Ordinance's harsh punishments, like as amputation of the hand or death by stoning, would become commonplace. The number of cases in which the Federal Shar'at Court sustained a sentence and was later reversed by higher courts was extremely low. There was minimal change in women's status as a result of the udd Ordinance being enacted in Pakistan. Similarly, it has not fundamentally impacted judicial proceedings in Pakistan or the interaction between the judicial and political institutions. Reference: (C. Kennedy, 1988)

The legal system in the country was also revamped by President Zia. In order to handle the influx of appeals brought on by the udd Ordinance's implementation, shari'at benches were added to the higher courts. Zia's dictatorship added "Shar'at Appellate Benches" to four superior courts in 1978. To hear Sharia petitions and consider appeals from udd law convictions, sharia appellate benches were established. With the advent of the Federal Shar'at Court, however, such benches were disbanded (Government of Pakistan, Introduction of Islamic Laws, Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1979). Reference: (C. Kennedy, 1988) In addition to the Federal Shar'at Court, a Shar'ah Council composed of Ulama was set up to review the country's laws and constitutions and bring them into line with Islamic principles.

To ensure that all matters were decided in line with the teachings of the Holy Quran and the Suunah of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him), in June 1980, an independent Federal Shar'at Court was created at Centre-Islamabad. (Kennedy, C1999) By an amendment to Article 203-D of the Constitution in 1982, the Court was given the authority to act Suo Moto where any Law or provision of Law appears to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The Federal Shar'at Court had the following responsibilities:

- To examine any law as defined in Article 203-B(c) and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam.

To affirm or pass other suitable order about any 'add penalty granted by the trial Court in udd statutes; To exercise appellate authority by hearing and deciding appeals in udd cases where the sentence of imprisonment awarded by the trial Court exceeds two years. No udd penalty can be carried out until this is confirmed;

- To use provisional powers to rehear any matter resolved by any Criminal Court under any statute pertaining to the implementation of udd.

In order to carry out its duties, the Federal Shar'at Court has been granted the authority of a regular civil court as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure, including the ability to: "summon and compel the attendance of any person and examine him on oath; require the discovery and production of any document; receive evidence on affidavits; and issue commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents." (Karachi, 1979)

The Shari'at Court would hear cases that had been appealed from higher courts and intermediate courts. The death penalty replaced life in jail as the maximum penalty for violating the blasphemy laws. The Federal Shar'at Court now has the same authority as the civil court. The Federal Shar'at Court was given jurisdiction to review judicial appeals, consider Shar'at petitions, and determine whether or not national legislation are in conflict with Islamic principles. By March of 1985, the Federal Shar'at Court in Pakistan had generated nearly twenty-seven distinct amendments to the constitution. The most prominent feature for many was strengthening blasphemy laws. These laws became stricter under Zia's regime, increasing the penalties for defaming Islam, which had significant social and legal repercussions in Pakistan. (Interview: Professor Ali Nawaz)

Economic Revitalization:

Prominent religious scholars were consulted in an effort to Islamicize Pakistan's economic system by creating regulations for Islamic funding. On June 20, 1980, an ordinance was passed that applies to all Islamic institutions, organisations, and groups in the country and collects Zakt (a religious tax-obligation for Muslims who meet the necessary standards of wealth) and 'Ushr (a charge or levy on agricultural produce). All bank accounts belonging to Muslims had 2.5% of their balances above Rs. 3,000 taken out on the first day of Ramadan (the holy month in Islam for fasting) as Zakt. The fee was calculated as 10% of the total annual harvest from the user's agricultural land. (Shah 2012) Zakat committees were set up at the national, provincial, district, and tehsil levels to help the poor and disadvantaged. Due to differences in religious jurisprudence, Shias groups were free from having Zakt takes deducted from their accounts.

The Shias, "who, buoyed with pride from the Iranian revolution, asserted the validity of their own religious interpretation," rejected Zia's Islamization policy because it was based on the Sunni version of Islamic theology and law. Therefore, the Shias sect saw Zia's Islamization strategy as a danger to their standing in Pakistani society and government. To counter Zia's Sunni Zakt Ordinance, Shia leaders rallied their adherents between 1979 and 1980. (Nasr 2002) The Zia regime was forced to exempt Shias from Zakt after a 5-day siege of Islamabad began on July 5, 1980. After the Shia uprisings, S.V.R. Nasr observed, "Zia's Islamization had, in effect, been reduced to 'Sinification,' undermining the universal Islamic claims of the entire process.

The goal of Islamization the Pakistani economic system led to the promulgation of ordinances and laws on Zakt, 'Ushr (tithe), the abolition of Riba (interest/usury) from the banking system, mudrabah (profit sharing), profit and loss share, and 12 modalities of Islamic financing. "(Haque and Hassan 1991)" On January 1, 1980, Zia mandated the implementation of a system of accounts known as "Profit and Loss Sharing," which marked the beginning of the Islamic notion of relinquishing Rib. The bank's P&L account holders were to split the institution's financial gains and losses.

Zia's Islamization strategy has considered reshaping Pakistan's economic structure by introducing Islamic banking. Banks are no longer allowed to charge interest (Rib), a new social welfare tax (Zakt) is being collected from the bank accounts of Sunni Muslims, and an Islamic land tax ('Ushr) has been instituted. In addition to these changes, Islamic economics have been studied in a number of new institutions across the country. (Kennedy, C 1999) Illusions, confusions, and misconceptions on the intellectual and practical planes resulted from the political scheme of Islamizing the economy of Pakistan during the Zia period, by the ruling elites of feudal, land- lords, capitalists, and both civilian and military bureaucrats who interpreted Islam as a legalistic ritual and legitimise the socio-religious concept of the mediaeval. "(Haque and Hassan 1991)"

Social Transformation:

Nizam-e-Mutafa is credited with instituting a number of social reforms, including the

promotion of chadar (modest dress) for women and the enforcement of laws on gambling. Kennedy, C., 1999) Zia's drive of Islamization in Pakistan included attacks on the country's media. Television and radio broadcasts deemed incompatible with Islam were censored, and the reading of the Arabic news was made mandatory. The Azan was broadcast routinely on radio and television five times a day to coincide with prayer hours. According to Islamic law, female anchors were required to wear the pardah and a headscarf while they were on air.

The government of Pakistan has promoted religious professors to the rank of commissioned officer in the armed services in an effort to recruit and retain capable personnel from religious institutions and universities. There is now a greater concentration of mosques around the nation. In order to preserve the dignity of the holy month of Ramadan, the Zia dictatorship issued a decree to that effect. During the holy month of Ramadan, public consumption of food and drink was prohibited by ordinance, with violators facing three months in prison and a fine of Rs.500. Zia also instituted the Nizam-e-alt programme to standardise prayer times across the country. According Dr Altaf to, Not entirely. While Islamic principles were always a part of Pakistan's foundation, Zia's Islamization represented a radical shift. His policies went beyond symbolic gestures and religious rhetoric, embedding Islamic laws into the legal and social fabric more deeply than before. (Interview: Professor Dr Altaf Hussain)

The idea of a woman's privacy being protected by a veil and four walls, or Chadar aur Chaar Devari, was introduced. Thus, a lady could receive lashes for adultery. If only two witnesses testified to the rape, the case would be treated as adultery. Two women's testimonies are now given the same weight as a single man's under the new Law of Evidence. In 1983, female activists led by the Women Action Forum, a group of college-educated women in Pakistan, took to the streets to demonstrate against Zia's regime's Evidence Law. Hundreds of women came out to resist the radical rule of General Zia, and the result was a historic demonstration. They were protesting a change to the Law of Evidence that would have given women's testimonies in criminal and financial proceedings less weight. (Taimur, 2010) Women's rights activists protested the statute because it gave women only half the weight of a man's testimony. They opposed the conservative reading of Zia policies and said that Islamization during Zia's rule threatened the rights of women and the rule of law. According to research.

General Zia established Majlis-i-Shra in 1980 to alter Pakistan's political and constitutional structure to conform to the Islamization strategy. It was stated that the National Assembly had been replaced by the Islamic Parliament of Pakistan. The Federal Government and its many agencies, departments, and organisations are mismanaged, so the Office of the Ombudsman was set up to confirm this.

Educational Modernization:

New educational institutions, such as the International Islamic University in Islamabad, the Shar'ah Training Institute, and other ulama training institutions, were founded as a result of educational reforms implemented in the country. Textbooks were revised to incorporate an Islamic approach to education, and the value placed on the Arabic language and Islamic Studies was raised. Islamic Studies, along with Arabic, is now required coursework for all post-baccalaureate degrees in the country, including BA, BS, MBBS, MBA, CE, JD, etc. Hafiz-e-Quran was given a higher grade because of his extensive professional training. (Kennedy, C 1999) A new revision of the History curriculum "omitted the pre-Islamic period of Indian history" and instead began with the Arab invasion of Sind. Ismaili Jamiat-e-Tulba, the organised student arm of Jamat-e-Islami, gained control of progressive student organisations when he outlawed students unions at colleges and universities. President Zia, according to Masood Akhtar Zahid, "used education as a foil and as an instrument of state control." (Zahid 2011)

Islamization and Its Stakeholders: Allies and Opponents:

There were four main factions that either helped or hindered Zia's Islamization (Nizm-e-Mu'tafa) in

Pakistan. Those groups' goals and interests diverged for various reasons. The first group consisted of General Zia Al-Haq and his political advisors, who played a role in the regime-wide promotion of Islamization initiatives. (Kennedy, C. 1999) The second group consisted of high-ranking judges and government employees who oversaw the Islamization of the government under General Zia. Although many bureaucrats disapproved of Zia's policies, only a select handful were given responsibility for carrying them out. The political opposition to Zia's Islamization efforts constituted the third faction. Islam-pasand, the fourth faction, were staunch supporters of Zia Nizam-e-Mutafa's policies.

Muslim nationalists pushed for the establishment of Pakistan in order to give Muslims on the subcontinent a place to establish their society in accordance with Islamic law and practice. Pakistan is a country with a Muslim majority, but its political elites have never quite figured out where Islam fits into the country's political system.

Pakistani politicians, like the country's military governments, have historically relied on Islamic ideology. For instance, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a politician known for his extreme secularism, gave his economic reforms the label of "Islamic socialism," and the PPP's platform proclaimed, "Islam is our ideology, socialism our economy, and democracy our politics." Similar to how General Zia Al-Haq legitimized his military regime using Islamic principles. Zia's military dictatorship was given a chance to gain legitimacy as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Zia dictatorship did more than just back the Afghan Mujahideen; they also spread the ideology of Jihad throughout Pakistani society. His goals in starting Pakistan's Islamization project were to strengthen his regime's legitimacy and give him more time in power. According to Charles H. Kennedy, Zia's "Nizam-e-Mustafa can be viewed as a policy designed in part to provide an Islamic justification for the continuation of a military-dominated regime." (Kennedy, C. 1999)

The global effects of General Zia's Islamization policy are substantial. His government was able to profit from the gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, where millions of Pakistanis are working and from which they transfer money back to their home country. Pakistan also rose to prominence within the Muslim community and the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC). Alongside Pakistan, another important hub of Islamic intellectual activity arose elsewhere in the area and beyond.

General Zia's Islamization initiatives were driven by the Jurists and Bureaucrats. Judges and bureaucrats alike were staunch Zia supporters and resistant to reform. They were well educated in the West, apolitical state employees, and their work was crucial to preserving peace and order. On the other hand, they were "Islamic moderates," or those who held a moderate view of Islam, and therefore they were receptive to Zia's ideas. (Kennedy, C. 1999) There are two political opponents in Pakistan to Zia's Islamization agenda. Zia's policies were criticised on both sides: by secular political opponents who said they went too far, and by Islamists who said they didn't go far enough.

Human rights, misogyny, reaction, undemocratic, anti-minority, and anti-rational arguments were among the many fronts from which secular political opponents attacked President Zia Nizam-e-Mutafa and his Islamization policies. Secular political opponents contended that the stoning to death, lashing, and amputation that were authorised under Zia's udd decree were harsh and barbaric since they violated basic human rights. Islamization, according to the misogynists, violates women's rights. Reactionaries argued that Zia's Islamization of the government was an attempt to return Pakistan to the time of the Caliphs, which would have been 1400 years ago. The dictatorship in Pakistan was propped up by Zia's Nizam-e-Mutafa policies, so the undemocratic argument goes. His policies had led to the suppression of political opponents and the outlawing of political parties.

Since Zia is ruled by the Sunni Hanafi fiqa, the anti-minority stance is also seen as anti-Shia. Non-Muslims, especially Ahmadiyes and Christians, in the country interpreted it as a kind of discrimination. The anti-rational argument held that Zia's Islamization efforts were obscurantist since they were in opposition to westernisation and modernity.

Opponents of General Zia's Islamization programmes typically used a combination of liberal and secular views. For instance, Benazir Bhutto's stance towards udd She criticised the ordinance in the

Muslim newspaper on February 12, 1988, calling it "reactionary," "anti-democratic," "anti-female," and "barbaric." She continued, saying, "the Zia-Juenjo regime is involved in making stoning to death and public hangings a spectator sport." (Kennedy, C. 1999) The military administration of General Zia in Pakistan strictly censored the country's media outlets, making it impossible for them to publicly oppose his Islamization initiatives. The administration, like the media, chose not to challenge exaggerations. The New York Time and the Guardian, two Western newspapers, published articles that called Zia "fundamentalist Islam" and emphasised the extremism of the movement.

Islamists in Pakistani society were unhappy with Zia's Islamization goals and their implementation. It was reasonable to feel that Zia's policies fell short of the mark. However, these individuals made up only a minor fraction of the administration structures overseeing the Islamization process. The bureaucracy and the courts were both dominated by moderate Muslims, who tended to consider the Islam-pasand as fanatics.

Opponents of Zia's administration on the political front did not enthusiastically embrace the Islamization measures called Nizam-e-Mutaf. PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) leader Benazir Bhutto fought hard against Zia's Islamization measures. Little was done by the Zia dictatorship to refute these claims; instead, they followed a policy of silence and instructed various institutions to avoid public debates with the opposition on issues related to his Islamization strategy and reforms. This opened the door for Benazir and her PPP party to take advantage of Zia's regressive policies. One of the most prominent concerns of the PPP agenda campaign during the national elections of 1988 was the status of women, which Benazir saw as being threatened by Zia's Islamization programmes.

Appraisal:

General Zia's primary strategy for legitimising his power and ensuring his regime's longevity was to promote Islamization. Zia's Islamization campaign found backing from the right-wing Muslim League, and religious parties like Jamat-e-Islami helped legitimise his rule. Zia spent much of his time at home with Sunni ulama and very little time with Shias. The Wahabis in particular viewed Zia as divine and saw in him a modern version of "ulama-friendly mediaeval monarchs." His administration began promoting the creation of a theocratic religious state, as opposed to one based on the principles of modern Islamic democracy. (Ahmed 1994) Zia was quickly promoted as the righteous guy, god's gift, and sincere man by the orthodox rightists, Jamaat-e-Islami, and its student wing Isami Jamaat- e-Talaba, who were all devout followers of Moudd.

Zia assured the people of Pakistan on numerous occasions that the Islamic system was the reason for Pakistan's creation. "There have been military coups before, but now for the first time a maulvi, a deeply religious person was the head of state, the head of government, and the army chief - a frightening combination," said Roedad Khan. Additionally, Khan argued that Zia was "determined to recreate the Islamic legal and social order which had originated in the tribal Arabia more than a thousand years earlier." Voting yes on Islamization in the 1984 presidential referendum meant also voting yes on Zia's confidence to continue as President of Pakistan for another five years, hence the question was thorny. He had requested a vote on Islam in order to secure his position as leader. In the name of God, he misled the faithful. He often used Islamic slogans to rally the masses to his cause. (M. Ahmed 2007), M. Ahmed Authoritarianism has contributed greatly to democratic disruptions and dysfunctional democracy in Pakistan," Masood Akhtar Zahid stated. General Zia Al-Haq's most repressive military regime, which declared democracy to be alien to the psyche of the Pakistani people, repeatedly chanted the mantra of a poorly defined and distorted concept of Islamic democracy, a veiled Islamic dictatorship, and crushed all attempts at egalitarian change. (Zahid 2011)

Conclusion:

The Islamization process was politicized under Zia's rule, and that had a major impact on Pakistan's political climate. Throughout his time in office, both under Zia and under the subsequent

governments, the Islamic reforms that he instituted in Pakistan's legal, constitutional, socioeconomic, and educational institutions were a hot topic in the country's politics. Repression of political parties, civic society, and students reached new heights under his Islamization initiatives. His Islamization programmes discriminated against women and persecuted the Shia minority in Pakistan. The enforcement of public morality and dress codes was quite prominent. Under Zia, there was a greater emphasis on modesty in dress, particularly for women, and public adherence to Islamic moral codes was strictly enforced. (Interview: Moulana Abdul Raza)

The measures were criticized for being anti-democratic, conservative, and discriminatory against women by those who opposed Zia's Islamization strategy. General Zia also attempted to make Shariah law the official legal code of the country, but he was unable due to lack of support from religious institutions and widespread public opposition. Zia envisioned Pakistan as the Islamic world's "fortress of Islam," an influential and respected leader in the Muslim community. His regime's Islamization policies had far-reaching effects on Pakistani society and government.

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